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MAKING INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION WORK:  
WHAT THE NATION BUILDING PRINCIPLES AND THREE 
CASE STUDIES FROM CHILE TEACH US ABOUT 
IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS HUMAN RIGHTS 
Laura M. Seelau* & Ryan Seelau** 
Introduction 
Self-determination is the only policy proven to benefit both Indigenous 
peoples and the nation-states in which they live. The right of self-
determination is valuable for Indigenous peoples because it allows them to 
envision their own futures, set their own goals, and make decisions 
necessary to transform those visions and goals into realities. In doing so, the 
right of self-determination begins the process of undoing the effects of 
centuries of assimilative policies. The right of self-determination also 
benefits nation-states because it is the only policy proven to improve the 
socioeconomic conditions of Indigenous communities—communities that 
are all too often among the nation-state’s most impoverished and 
disadvantaged.1 
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 1. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination: The 
Political Economy of a Policy That Works 14 (HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
No. RWP10-043, 2010) [hereinafter Cornell & Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination] 
(“[F]ederal promotion of tribal self-government under formal policies known as ‘self-
determination’ is turning out to be [...] the only strategy that has worked.”). 
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Under international law, the right of Indigenous self-determination has 
been implicitly recognized for more than two decades, beginning with the 
ratification of International Labour Organization Convention Number 169 
(Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention)2, and has been explicitly 
recognized as a norm of international law since the adoption of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.3 Thus, on 
paper at least, there is a global policy recognizing Indigenous self-
determination as a fundamental right. Despite this global recognition, in 
practice, many Indigenous peoples continue to have a diminished ability to 
exercise self-determination, frequently due to legal or political obstacles 
imposed by the nation-state, but also very commonly due to a lack of 
capacity within their own communities.4 As a consequence, Indigenous 
populations remain among the most marginalized populations found 
anywhere in the world.5 
The good news is that some Indigenous peoples are beginning to break 
the cycles of dependency and poverty that have been forced upon them for 
so long. In many parts of the world, Indigenous peoples are embracing new 
opportunities created by legal changes that have ushered in policies of self-
determination. Indigenous culture is, in many areas, experiencing a 
                                                                                                                 
 2. International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention No. 169 Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]. 
 3. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 3, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Mar. 2008) (“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”). 
 4. See generally the following country reports of the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Freedoms, which provide insight into the status of 
indigenous self-determination globally:  United States of America, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/21/47/Add.1 (Aug. 2010); Sami People of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/18/35/Add.2 (Jun. 2011); Russia, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.5 (Jun. 2010); New 
Caledonia, France, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.6 (Sept. 2011); Nepal, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/12/34/Add.3 (Jul. 2009); Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.5 
(Jul. 2011); Australia, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.4 (Jun. 2010); Namibia, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/24/41/Add.1 (Jun. 2013); Canada, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.2 (Jul. 2014); 
Panama, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1 (May 2014).  See also Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/317 (Aug. 2013); Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Final Rep. 
of the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/18/42 (Aug. 2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Development ch. 1, at 3 (Gillette Hall & 
Harry Patrinos eds., Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Cambridge 
University Press). 
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revitalization not seen for centuries. Across the globe, Indigenous peoples 
are successfully regaining control over ancestral lands, recovering cultural 
property, revitalizing the use of traditional languages, recreating Indigenous 
governments and governing institutions, and renewing religious practices, 
ceremonies, and other culturally significant experiences.6 While there 
remains a great deal of work to be done, Indigenous peoples are moving 
towards the day when control over their futures will return to its rightful 
place—their own hands. 
Although much has been written on what nation-states can and should do 
to implement the right of Indigenous self-determination, there has been far 
less discourse on what Indigenous peoples and communities themselves can 
do to regain control over their own lives.7 Perhaps, the most complete 
answer to the question, “what can Indigenous peoples do to turn the right of 
self-determination into a reality?” comes from the work of the Harvard 
Project on American Indian Economic Development (HPAIED) and its 
sister organization, the Native Nations Institute for Leadership, 
Management, and Policy of the University of Arizona (NNI). In the decades 
since the United States government made Indigenous self-determination its 
official policy, HPAIED and NNI have systematically investigated what 
self-determination looks like from the Native perspective. Specifically, 
HPAIED and NNI have examined what Native nations in the United States 
can do to rebuild their governments and governance institutions, to improve 
their socioeconomic conditions; and to achieve whatever goals they set for 
themselves.8 The totality of their efforts have revealed five principles—
commonly referred to as “Nation Building principles”—that tend to be 
                                                                                                                 
 6. For a general overview of how far Indigenous rights have come in practice and 
documentation of many gains made by Indigenous peoples, see INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 
(2009); DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2009); see also Statement of Special Rapporteur to UN General 
Assembly, 2013, JAMES ANAYA (Oct. 21, 2013), http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/ 
statement-of-special-rapporteur-to-un-general-assembly-2013. 
 7. See sources cited supra note 4. 
 8. See, e.g., Cornell & Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination, supra note 1; 
Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where’s the Glue?: Institutional Bases of American 
Indian Economic Development (Harvard Law Sch., Malcolm Wiener Ctr. for Soc. Pol’y, 
Working Paper Series H-91-2, 1991); JOSEPH P. KALT & JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, MYTHS 
AND REALITIES OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INDIAN SELF-RULE 
(Native Nations Inst. & Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Joint Occasional Papers 
on Native Affairs, No. 2004-03, 2004). 
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more closely adhered to by Native nations effectively exercising self-
determination than by Native nations that are not.9 
In recent years, the applicability of the Nation Building principles for 
enhancing Indigenous self-determination in practice has been tested outside 
the United States. Although research is ongoing, there is now evidence that 
the Nation Building principles have relevance for Indigenous peoples trying 
to exercise their right to self-determination in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand.10 However, no substantial research efforts have been made to 
determine whether the Nation Building principles have applicability beyond 
nation-states that share a common language (English), legal tradition 
(British common law tradition), and history (former British colonies). 
This article begins to fill that void by examining whether the Nation 
Building principles have any applicability outside the British colonial 
context. Specifically, this article explores whether the Nation Building 
principles have applicability in Chile. Chile is a compelling choice for this 
type of analysis because it is a South American country with a culture, 
history, language, political structure, and legal tradition distinct from those 
of the former British colonies. Additionally, the Chilean government has 
made Indigenous rights a priority in recent years,11 and, unlike many other 
South American countries with Indigenous populations, Chile enjoys a 
                                                                                                                 
 9. The five Nation Building principles are discussed in more depth at infra Part II, and 
include: practical self-rule; capable governing institutions; cultural match; strategic 
orientation; and public-spirited leadership. 
 10. STEPHEN CORNELL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POVERTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 2 (Native Nations Inst. & 
Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 
2006-02, 2006) [hereinafter CORNELL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES].  
 11. It was only in 1993 that Chile adopted national legislation relating to indigenous 
peoples with the passage of Law 19.253, commonly known as the Indigenous Law (Law No. 
19.253, September 28, 1993 (Chile)). Much more recently, in 2007, Chile voted in favor of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; in 2008 after nearly twenty 
years of debate, Chile ratified ILO Convention 169, supra note 2, and also passed landmark 
legislation on coastal water rights for indigenous peoples (Law No. 20.249, Feb. 16, 2008 
(Chile)). By the time Convention 169 went into effect in 2009, Chile had adopted a provisional 
consultation regulation (Decreto No. 124 del Ministerio de Planificación que reglamenta el 
artículo 34 de la Ley No. 19.253 a fin de regular la consulta y la participación de los pueblos 
indígenas (2009)) and has been actively debating its Indigenous consultation policy since that 
time (Gerson Guzmán, Conadi aprueba comisión para trabajar en consulta indígena con 




No. 1] THREE CASE STUDIES FROM CHILE 141 
 
 
relatively strong economy and stable political system.12 Most importantly, 
Chilean Indigenous populations currently exercise small but meaningful 
amounts of self-determination.13 This allows us to test the applicability of 
the Nation Building principles within the Chilean context. 
Ultimately, this article argues that the Nation Building principles are 
relevant to the situation in Chile and, more broadly, that they may be 
relevant throughout all of Latin America. This argument is presented in 
three parts. Part I examines what the Indigenous right of self-determination 
is, why it is important, and how Indigenous peoples themselves can exercise 
it effectively. Research indicates that Indigenous peoples are more effective 
at exercising self-determination when the Nation Building principles are 
more closely adhered to.14 Thus, Part I introduces the Nation Building 
principles and looks at the current limitations of their applicability outside 
the British colonial context. Part II lays the groundwork necessary for 
determining whether the Nation Building principles have relevance and 
applicability outside the British colonial context—utilizing Chile as the 
focal point of a comparative analysis. Part III looks at how Indigenous 
communities living within Chile exercise their right to self-determination 
and asks whether the Nation Building principles can be found anywhere in 
those situations. Ultimately, Part III argues that the Nation Building 
principles are both relevant and applicable to the Indigenous context in 
Chile. In our conclusion, we offer final thoughts on: what the Nation 
Building principles have to offer Indigenous peoples in Chile moving 
forward; what applicability the Nation Building principles may have for 
Indigenous peoples living elsewhere in Latin America; and what research is 
needed next to continue the comparative analysis started here. 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Chile’s Human Development Index ranks fortieth out of 187 countries analyzed in 
the 2013 Human Development Report, which is the highest rank of countries in Latin 
American and the Caribbean.  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: THE RISE OF THE SOUTH: 
HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD 143 (U.N. Dev. Program, 2013), available at 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/CHL.pdf. 
 13. RYAN SEELAU & LAURA SEELAU, THE PUKARÁ OF QUITOR: AN INDIGENOUS SELF-
DETERMINATION CASE STUDY (2013) [hereinafter SEELAU & SEELAU, THE PUKARÁ OF 
QUITOR]; Laura M. Seelau & Ryan Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios: Coadministración 
entre Comunidades Atacameñas y el Estado Chileno en Valle de la Luna, in DEFENSA DE LOS 
DERECHOS TERRITORIALES EN LATINOAMÉRICA 129 (Margarita Fernández & Javier Salinas 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios]. 
 14. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the Development of Native 
Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 6 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007) [hereinafter Cornell & 
Kalt, Two Approaches]. 
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I. Self-Determination and the Nation Building Principles 
A. What Is the Indigenous Right of Self-Determination? 
The Indigenous right of self-determination is, at its most basic level, the 
right of Indigenous peoples to have meaningful control over the issues that 
affect their lives and culture.15 As the United Nations’ Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples states, “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”16 The principle of Indigenous self-determination is 
recognized implicitly and explicitly in various international legal 
instruments and is a fundamental human right.17  
Self-determination is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather, 
manifests itself on a spectrum. Indigenous peoples exercise self-
determination in a less robust form by providing input and feedback into the 
                                                                                                                 
 15. A full discussion of the meaning and nature of Indigenous self-determination in 
international law is beyond the scope of this paper, however, the authors wish to highlight 
two over-arching issues associated with the right of Indigenous self-determination: first, 
what are the terms under which Indigenous peoples are (or are not) incorporated into the 
larger institutional structure of a nation-state such that they can “freely determine their 
political status”?; and second, what is the mechanisms through which Indigenous peoples are 
able to “freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development”? James Anaya 
refers to these two components as the “constitutive” and “ongoing” elements of Indigenous 
self-determination. This paper primarily focuses on the second of these elements: how do 
Indigenous peoples exercise self-determination in its ongoing nature—within the nation 
states in which they live—to determine and pursue their own economic, social and cultural 
development? See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2d ed. 2004).  
 16. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 3, art. 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295, at 4. 
 17. For a general understanding of international legal recognition of Indigenous self-
determination, see, for example, Lee Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and 
International Law: Recent Developments, 30 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 259 (1989); Lee 
Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Populations: A Return to Centre Stage, 126 INT’L LABOUR 
REV. 447 (1987); Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International law on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 677 (1990) 
[hereinafter Swepston, A New Step]; S. James Anaya, El Derecho de los Pueblos indígenas a 
la libre determinación tras la adopción de la Declaración, in EL DESAFÍO DE LA 
DECLARACIÓN: HISTORIA Y FUTURO DE LA DECLARACIÓN DE LA ONU SOBRE PUEBLOS 
INDÍGENAS 194 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009); S. James Anaya, A 
Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1993); Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of 
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1993). 
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decisions that will affect their communities. On the other hand, Indigenous 
peoples are exercising a more robust form of self-determination when they 
form governing institutions, choose their own leaders, make goals, and 
carry out plans to turn those goals into realities. While Indigenous peoples 
are at different points along the self-determination spectrum, international 
law promotes an ever-increasing level of Indigenous self-determination for 
all Indigenous peoples. 
B. Why Does Indigenous Self-Determination Matter? 
1. To Indigenous Peoples  
The Indigenous right of self-determination matters to Indigenous peoples 
because it is the right that, when broadly implemented, seeks to put 
Indigenous peoples back in charge of their own lives, communities, and 
cultures. All Indigenous peoples have distinct cultures, religious beliefs, 
traditions, values and worldviews worth protecting. All Indigenous peoples 
are made up of individuals who deserve to live a life of their choosing. The 
Indigenous right of self-determination is the mechanism by which 
Indigenous peoples can regain control over all of these things. Exercising 
this right is how Indigenous peoples can combat the effects of centuries of 
assimilation. In short, the Indigenous right of self-determination offers 
Indigenous peoples a chance to move forward in a manner of their own 
design which secures the continuation of their culture and society. 
2. To Nation-States 
Nation-states should concern themselves with the Indigenous right of 
self-determination because the only policy shown to improve the lives and 
socioeconomic conditions of Indigenous individuals is one of self-
determination.18 While other valid ethical, legal, and moral arguments exist 
for embracing a policy of Indigenous self-determination,19 it is self-
determination’s proven effectiveness that is likely to convince most nation-
states to embrace it. Simply put, nation-states should embrace Indigenous 
self-determination because it is their own self-interest to do so. 
More than two hundred years of evidence from the United States proves 
that a policy of Indigenous self-determination is the only policy that can 
improve the lives and socioeconomic conditions of Indigenous individuals. 
United States policies of war, treaty-making, assimilation, allotment, 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Cornell & Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination, supra note 1. 
 19. Anaya, El Derecho de los Pueblos indígenas a la libre determinación tras la 
adopción de la Declaración, supra note 17 at 194.  
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reorganization, and termination have all failed miserably to do anything but 
make Native peoples the most impoverished and disadvantaged group in the 
nation.20 It was not until the United States government adopted a policy of 
Indigenous self-determination—through passage of legislation like the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 197521—that 
the situation of marginalization and poverty began improving for Native 
nations. While the socioeconomic conditions of Native Americans continue 
to fall below the national average, there has been substantial improvement 
over the last four decades.22 For example, some Native nations have 
virtually eliminated unemployment and improved life expectancy by leaps 
and bounds, while others have built strong economies and reduced poverty 
among their people by staggering amounts.23 
Indigenous self-determination works because it is a bottom-up policy. 
The positive changes seen among United States Native nations never would 
have been achieved by a single policy, program, or fund designed in 
Washington, D.C., and then imposed on Native nations across the nation.24 
Rather, positive change for Native nations comes when, by recognizing the 
right of self-determination, Native peoples are empowered to be innovators 
and problem solvers in their own communities. Although the United States 
federal government has played and continues to play an important 
supporting role with respect to many Indigenous self-determination efforts, 
success and sustainability are only realized when the impetus for change 
comes from the Native nations themselves.   
C. What Can Indigenous Peoples Themselves Do to Better Exercise Their 
Right of Self-Determination? 
When questions are asked about how the Indigenous right of self-
determination can be effectively implemented, the answers more often than 
not revolve around what nation-states can and should be doing. 
International bodies involved in Indigenous rights have produced countless 
reports detailing the shortcomings of nation-states with respect to 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Cornell & Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination, supra note 1, at 14 (“[F]ederal 
promotion of tribal self-government under formal policies known as ‘self-determination’ is 
turning out to be . . . the only strategy that has worked.”). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450-450n 
(2012)). 
 22. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
 23. See, e.g., REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007). 
 24. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 14-15, 27-28. 
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recognizing and/or implementing Indigenous rights.25 Similarly, the vast 
majority of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in the field 
also tend to focus their research and writing on what nation-state 
governments need to do to bring about Indigenous self-determination.26 
While this work is continuously necessary to ensure that nation-states 
adheres to international human rights law with respect to Indigenous 
peoples, it is all too often overlooked that Indigenous peoples have a role to 
play in actualizing self-determination. 
Two organizations—HPAIED and NNI—have made it their purpose to 
determine what Indigenous communities can do to more effectively 
exercise their rights.27 With more than three decades of quantitative and 
qualitative research under their collective belts, HPAIED and NNI have 
determined that even where a nation-state has adopted policies and 
legislation recognizing and promoting self-determination, that right simply 
does not come to fruition in practice unless Indigenous peoples similarly 
embrace their own crucial role in making self-determination a reality.28 
More specifically, the research of HPAIED and NNI has revealed five 
principles that are critical for any Indigenous community wishing to take 
control of its own future and exercise self-determination effectively. These 
five principles are commonly referred to as the “Nation Building 
principles.”29 
  
                                                                                                                 
 25. This includes reports from United Nations treaty monitoring bodies such as the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as 
well as from thematic entities such as the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These reports — 
which exist to assess a given state’s compliance with treaty obligations — routinely issue 
recommendations and observations for the states, but much less frequently do so for 
indigenous peoples. A similar practice is seen in reports produced by the ILO, including not 
only periodic reports, but also those issued by expert committees in the context of 
Representations brought under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution.  
 26. See , e.g., ALBERTO SALDAMANDO, U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSOLIDATED INDIGENOUS SHADOW REPORT (2007). 
 27. Editor’s Introduction to REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at xi-xii.  HPAIED has been conducting 
Native-focused research in the United States Country since the 1980s. NNI, created in 2001, 
is a sister organization of HPAIED, that also conducts Native-focused research while 
simultaneously offering services to Indigenous communities in the areas of governance 
strengthening, institutional development, and capacity building. Id.  
 28. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 28-32. 
 29. See generally Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14. 
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1. Nation Building Principles: Origins 
When HPAIED began its research in the 1980s, it sought to answer the 
question: What explained emerging patterns of economic change and 
community development in Indian Country?30 The research initially carried 
out by HPAIED indicated that the strength or weakness of Native nation 
economies in the United States could not be explained solely by 
characteristics such as access to natural resources, education attainment 
levels, proximity to markets, or culture.31 Instead, the answer seemed to 
relate to the manner—formal or informal—of organization within a given 
Indigenous community.32 It became clear that the way a Native nation 
organized itself and carried out its decisions was actually the most 
important factor for determining whether a Native nation would have a 
strong or weak economy.33  
Over time, HPAIED and NNI stopped focusing solely on Native nation 
economies, and turned to a broader question: Why are some Native nations 
able to create visions of their own futures and make those visions a reality, 
while other Native nations struggle to do the same?34 Essentially, the 
question shifted from one about economic development to one that focused 
on the ability of Native nations to exercise self-determination.35 The data 
indicates that the answer to this question also relates closely to the formal 
or informal organization (or lack thereof) found in a given Native 
community.36 More specifically, the data indicates that five principles—the 
Nation Building principles—are commonly associated with Native nations 
that exercise their rights effectively. Conversely, Native nations struggling 
to exercise self-determination are lacking in one or more of these same 
principles.37  
                                                                                                                 
 30. Editor’s Introduction, supra note 28, at xi. 
 31. See, e.g., STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND HETEROGENEITY OF GOVERNMENT FORM ON AMERICAN INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS (Harvard Law Sch., Malcolm Wiener Ctr. for Soc. Pol’y, No. PRS 95-4, 
1995); STEPHEN CORNELL, FIVE MYTHS, THREE PARTIAL TRUTHS, A ROBUST FINDING, AND 
TWO TASKS (Harvard Law Sch., Malcolm Wiener Ctr. for Soc. Pol’y, No. PRS 94-5, 1994). 
 32. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 22.  
 33. Id. 
 34. STEPHEN CORNELL ET AL., SEIZING THE FUTURE: WHY SOME NATIVE NATIONS DO 
AND OTHERS DON’T 4 (Native Nations Inst. & Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., 
Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2005-01, 2005). 
 35. REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 14. 
 36. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 22. 
 37. Id. at 18. 
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2. Nation Building Principles: Substance 
The Nation Building principles are: (1) practical self-rule; (2) strong, 
effective and capable governing institutions; (3) cultural match; (4) 
strategic orientation; and (5) public-spirited leadership.38 It is important to 
note that the Nation Building principles are principles; they are not a 
generic, all-inclusive guide explaining how all Indigenous communities can 
effectively exercise self-determination. Indigenous communities, like all 
communities, are extremely complex systems. The Nation Building 
principles are universal in that they identify the properties most commonly 
associated with meaningful exercises of Indigenous self-determination, but 
are also flexible enough that they can be molded to fit a wide variety of 
contexts. 
a) Nation Building Principle Number One: Practical Self-Rule 
Practical self-rule exists when the real power to make decisions resides 
with Native nations themselves.39 In the United States, all federally 
recognized tribes have the right, on paper, to make their own decisions,40 
but the reality is that not all Native nations actually can and do exercise this 
right on a daily basis. While having the right of self-determination has some 
benefits, it is the actual exercise of the right that is far more significant to a 
Native nation’s ability to realize its own goals and visions. 
When Native nations make decisions for themselves, the results are 
better. Recent Native American history is the story of external or foreign 
governments trying to administer Indigenous resources, run programs for 
Indigenous peoples, and to make decisions on their behalf.41 These efforts 
by external decision-makers, whether motivated by good or evil intentions, 
are substantially less effective than Native nations’ own efforts in the same 
regard.42 Native nations exercising practical self-rule have outperformed 
external governments in a variety of contexts, including: inventing more 
efficient and more sustainable systems of management for natural 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450-450n (2012)). 
 41. Stephen Cornell, Remaking the Tools of Governance: Colonial Legacies, Indigenous 
Solutions, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 57, 59-60. 
 42. JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, DETERMINANTS OF DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS IN NATIVE 
NATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (Native Nations Inst. for Leadership, Mgmt. & Policy & 
Harvard Project on American Indian Econ. Dev., 2008). 
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resources; acquiring better prices for the sale of products; developing more 
effective social programs, including health and educational programs; and 
creating communities where Native citizens want to live.43  
There are two primary reasons why Native nation decision-makers 
outperform external decision-makers. First, with practical self-rule, the 
development strategy—whether cultural, economic, political, or social—
rests in the hands of Native nations. It better reflects the interests, visions 
and concerns of the people who will be affected by the strategy. Native 
nation leaders are closer to local conditions and possess a better 
understanding of the needs, values, and desires of their communities. As 
such, their decisions more closely match the community’s priorities than do 
those of an outsider, which tends to result in more legitimate and better 
decision-making.44Second, practical self-rule ensures that there is a 
connection between those who make the decision and those who have to 
live with the consequences of the decision. Tying consequences to the 
decision ultimately results in better decision-making.45 
b) Nation Building Principle Number Two: Capable Governing 
Institutions 
In addition to practical self-rule, the HPAIED and NNI research also 
indicates that “stable, fair, effective and reliable governing institutions” are 
crucial to a Native nation’s ability to meaningfully exercise self-
determination.46 This second Nation Building principle addresses the way in 
which self-rule is exercised.47 Native nations can have the right of self-
determination and the right to self-government, but those rights are 
meaningless without the ability to exercise them effectively.48 “Without 
effective institutions, asserting the powers of self-government means 
little . . . . The powers of self-government come with the burdens of 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 21; TAYLOR, supra note 42. 
 46. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 24. 
 47. When international law talks about the Indigenous right to self-determination, it 
frequently starts with a discussion of the right to consultation with “Indigenous peoples’ 
representative institutions”. Decades of attempting to implement the right of consultation 
have revealed that enormous difficulties arise when Indigenous peoples’ representative 
institutions do not exist or are not clearly defined. The Nation Building principles speak 
directly to this substantial obstacle to the implementation of international human rights law 
related to Indigenous peoples.   
 48. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/3
No. 1] THREE CASE STUDIES FROM CHILE 149 
 
 
governing effectively.”49 Only when stable and capable governing 
institutions exist can the rights of self-determination and of self-government 
be fully realized.  When a Native nation has strong, effective, capable 
institutions, they have the capacity to turn the desires of the community into 
concrete actions. 
Governing institutions can take many different forms. Generally, the 
term “governing institutions” conjures images of written constitutions, 
bureaucratic offices, courts and the other familiar components that form 
modern-day democracies. In the Nation Building context, “governing 
institutions” are defined simply as the accepted forms of organization—
whether formal or informal—within a community; the way authority is 
exercised in a community—that is, who exercises it and through what 
procedures; and the mechanisms by which community decisions are carried 
out.50 The important aspect of a governing institution—which will be 
developed further in the discussion of the third Nation Building principle—
is not whether it is formal or informal, but that it is designed by the Native 
nation it serves.51  
Although governing institutions may adopt a variety of forms, Native 
nation experiences in the United States indicate that not all institutions are 
equally effective. There are three criteria that determine whether an 
institution is effective. First, governing institutions—whatever form they 
take—must be stable. The norms of conduct and the processes for assigning 
authority to someone can neither change frequently nor arbitrarily. Second, 
governing institutions must be able to execute tasks in a timely and 
trustworthy manner. The institutions must be capable of converting 
decisions into concrete actions. Third, to be effective, governing institutions 
generally require a division of labor.52 For instance, effective governing 
institutions are oftentimes separated so that political issues are dealt with in 
a manner distinct from that of other activities such as conflict resolution, 
services management and delivery, or business administration.53 
  
                                                                                                                 
 49. TAYLOR, supra note 42, at 3. 
 50. STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, ROLLING THE DICE: IMPROVING THE CHANCES 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 17 (Native Nations Inst. 
& Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, 
No. 2003-02, 2003) [hereinafter CORNELL & KALT, ROLLING THE DICE]. 
 51. TAYLOR, supra note 42, at 4. 
 52. Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 23. 
 53. Id. at 22-23. 
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c) Nation Building Model Principle Number Three: Cultural Match 
The third Nation Building principle answers the question: What makes a 
governing institution effective?54  To be effective, an institution must have 
legitimacy, and to have legitimacy the institution must “culturally match” 
the community it is serving.55 Legitimate institutions need to be rooted in 
the culture and values of the community they represent. Specifically, they 
need to appropriately reflect the community’s expectations of how power 
and authority are distributed and utilized. For example, some Native nations 
value the concentration of political power and authority in a single elected 
official, while other Native nations value power that is dispersed and shared 
among several people chosen by a consensus of the entire community. It is 
crucial that governing institutions are organized in a manner that conforms 
to the Native citizens’ expectations of how power and decision-making 
authority should be allocated.56 
All societies require legitimate governing institutions to function as 
collectives, but when Native nations design their own culturally appropriate 
governing institutions, they begin reversing the effects of a uniquely brutal 
history of assimilation. For centuries, Native nations have been subjected to 
assimilative policies,57 designed to impose rules, institutions, and processes 
upon Native nations that did not match their culture or reflect their values.58 
Even when policies were supposed to be benevolent towards Native 
peoples, Native nations were still required to adopt governmental systems 
that lacked legitimacy and authenticity in the communities they were 
intended to benefit.59 For example, during the era of reorganization, Native 
nations were pushed into adopting one-size-fits-all constitutions that were 
written by outsiders. These culturally inappropriate constitutions frequently 
caused more problems than they solved, especially with respect to Native 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 25 (“Building legitimate institutions . . . means tapping into Indigenous 
political cultures. . . . The crucial issue is the degree of match or mismatch between formal 
governing institutions and today’s Indigenous ideas . . . about the appropriate form and 
organization of political power. . . .  Where cultural match is low, the legitimacy of tribal 
government also tends to be low, [and] governing institutions consequently are less 
effective[.]”). 
 55. Id. at 24-25. 
 56. Id. at 25. 
 57. See generally Ryan Seelau, Regaining Control over the Children: Reversing the 
Legacy of Assimilative Policies in Education, Child Welfare, and Juvenile Justice That 
Targeted Native American Youth, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63 (2012-2013).  
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nations whose cultural values and expectations about the distribution of 
authority were vastly different from what was written in the constitution 
they were provided. The principle of cultural match seeks to reverse this 
historical trend of cultural assimilation by the creation—or recreation—of 
institutions and structures based upon the Native peoples’ own cultural 
values.60 
For Native nations, matching culture to their governing institutions does 
not necessarily mean turning back the clock and re-installing traditional 
governing systems. In many cases, turning back the clock is impossible 
because ancestral traditions and customs have been lost. In other cases, 
returning to customary practices is neither practical nor ideal. It is important 
to remember that culture is not static; it is dynamic. Culture changes and 
adapts to new situations and challenges. Likewise, governing institutions 
that incorporate cultural values may look differently today than they did 
five hundred years ago. Culturally-appropriate governing institutions need 
to be responsive to the modern world’s unique challenges. The principle of 
cultural match thus requires Native nations to identify the problems they 
currently face, determine what their current values and goals are with 
respect to those problems, and then design their governing institutions 
accordingly.61 It may be necessary to revive old institutions and practices, 
or to invent and develop new ones.  
Although it can prove difficult, effective Native nation governing 
institutions find a way to balance the demands of modern society and the 
values of their people.62 Finding this equilibrium is not an abandonment of 
culture or tradition, but is a reinvention of traditional values to confront 
new problems—something that Native peoples have done repeatedly 
throughout history.63 Regardless of what the final product looks like, Native 
nation governing institutions must reflect the expectations and values of the 
communities that they represent and serve, or they will not be effective.64 
d) Nation Building Model Principle Number Four: Strategic Orientation 
Strategic orientation refers to the manner in which successful Native 
nations approach decision-making.65 Successful and sustainable community 
development begins with the question, “What kind of society or community 
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are we trying to build?”66 Answering this question requires a long-term 
vision for the nation’s future, and should be done before any action takes 
place. Once a vision exists, a strategic orientation considers the question: 
How do we put in place the systems and policies necessary to build the type 
of society we envision?67 This question forces Native nations to consider 
the long-term sustainability of their visions, and of the nation as a whole. 
Effective strategic decision-making may involve substantial time and 
research, but the result is a clear goal with clear steps on how to achieve it 
and sustain it. 
e) Nation Building Model Principle Number Five: Public-Spirited 
Leadership 
The final Nation Building principle is public-spirited leadership. A lack 
of effective leadership results in little, if anything, getting done. 
Community support and community action are necessary for societies to 
grow and change, but without leadership, these essential factors are often 
missing.68  That said, what makes an effective leader? The Nation Building 
research indicates that an effective leader is primarily concerned with 
“putting in place the institutional and strategic foundations for sustained 
development and enhanced community welfare.”69 Under this definition, 
leadership is not limited to government officials, but includes any citizen 
who takes responsibility for the future of his or her nation.70 
3. Nation Building Principles: Limitations 
Although the Nation Building principles were developed based on years 
of research within the United States, their applicability to other British 
colonial contexts has been examined and continues to be investigated.71 The 
initial results suggest that the Nation Building principles have applicability 
not only in the United States, but also in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand.72  When comparing the four nations: 
There is substantial evidence from the U.S. case that Indigenous 
self-determination has been a critical element in the effort by 
American Indian nations to improve their socio-economic 
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conditions. While Indigenous situations in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and the U.S. vary, certain commonalities 
encourage comparative inquiry and a search for transferable 
policy insights. They suggest that it would be a mistake for other 
governments to dismiss the U.S. evidence.73 
To be sure, more research and analysis is required to determine how 
meaningful the Nation Building principles are in the former British 
colonies. Additionally, no research has attempted to look at whether the 
Nation Building principles have any value outside the English-speaking 
world. While the Nation Building principles have been powerful tools 
where they have been utilized, thus far their global impact has been limited 
predominantly to the United States. 
II. Chile 
A. Chile, the Nation-State 
Chile is a South American nation state bordered by the Pacific Ocean on 
the west, the Andes Mountains on the east, the Atacama Desert to the north, 
and Antarctica to the south.74 Chile has a population exceeding seventeen 
million people75 and is ranked thirty-seventh in the world in terms of land 
area.76 It is a former Spanish colony that fought for its independence from 
Spain in 1810 and formally declared independence in 1818.77 Chile is a 
unitary presidential constitutional republic with one of the strongest 
economies in the world.78 
Chile has a number of advantages for the type of comparative analysis 
attempted in this article, but three characteristics of the nation make it 
particularly useful for our purposes. First, Chile’s culture, history, language, 
political institutions, legal institutions, and even geography are unique from 
anywhere the Nation Building principles have been tested in the past 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). Second, Chile 
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possesses a strong, steady economy and a stable government.79 A strong 
economy and stable government are not required for our comparison, but 
their presence allows the focus to turn to what Indigenous communities can 
do to exercise self-determination and eliminates a discussion of whether a 
nation-state’s poor economic conditions and/or unstable government are 
actually responsible for the plight of Indigenous peoples in a given part of 
the world. In other words, this article is interested in what Indigenous 
peoples are able to do for themselves, and is not overly interested in how 
nation-state governments need to alter their practices for the benefit of 
Indigenous peoples—that specific topic is certainly important, but it is also 
the subject of most comparative analyses involving Indigenous peoples. 
Finally, Chile has a substantial body of literature in accessible formats, 
which provides the basis for this type of comparison to take place at all. 
With these three characteristics in mind, the remainder of Part II offers a 
brief picture of the Indigenous peoples who live within Chile’s boundaries, 
and discusses the current political-legal environment with respect to the 
right of Indigenous self-determination. 
B. The Indigenous Peoples Living in Chile 
Chile recognizes nine Indigenous people groups living within its borders: 
the Aymara, Colla, Diaguita, Kawésqar, Likan Antai (or Atacameño), 
Mapuche, Quechua, Rapa Nui, and Yagán.80 Determining the precise 
Indigenous population, however, is a difficult task. There are three major 
sources of population information: the national census, the most recent of 
which was completed in 2012;81 the CASEN study (Encuesta de 
Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional—the National Socio-economic 
Characterization Survey), conducted every two to three years by the 
Ministry of Social Development;82 and data from CONADI (Corporación 
Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena—the National Indigenous Development 
Corporation), which is charged with issuing Indigenous accreditation 
                                                                                                                 
 79. While not always the case, Chile has enjoyed both a stable economy and stable 
political system since it returned to democracy in 1990. 
 80. Law No. 19.253, art. 1, September 28, 1993 (Chile).  
 81. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICAS, CENSO 2012: RESULTADOS XVIII CENSO DE 
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certificates to individuals and with maintaining records of all the registered 
Indigenous communities and associations.83 
The 2012 Chilean census data and the results of the most recent CASEN 
study are the numbers that drive public policy with respect to Indigenous 
peoples, and likely offer the most accurate picture of Indigenous peoples 
living in Chile. According to the 2012 Chilean census, the total population 
of Chile is just over 16.5 million people with 11.11% or approximately 1.7 
million individuals, self-identifying as Indigenous.84 Those numbers are 
slightly higher than the results of the 2011 CASEN, which calculated the 
Indigenous population at 1.4 million individuals, constituting 8.1% of the 
total population of Chile.85 Both datasets clearly indicate that the 
Indigenous population in Chile has been increasing over the last several 
years, both in terms of raw numbers and in terms of the percentage of the 
total population that identifies as Indigenous.86 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena—
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 84. CENSO 2012: RESULTADOS XVIII CENSO DE POBLACIÓN, supra note 81, at 172.  This 
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2012 Census External Review Committee) issued a report highlighting multiple deficiencies 
in the 2012 census data, and recommended that the data not be used for certain purposes. Id.  
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2012 (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.censo.cl/documentos/informe_final-comision-
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populations. CENSO 2012: RESULTADOS XVIII CENSO DE POBLACIÓN, supra note 81, at 84. 
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Ultimately, the questions utilized on the 2012 census were different from those that had 
appeared in earlier censuses and were also distinct from similar questions used by other data 
collection organizations with respect to Indigenous peoples.  Id. 
 85. PUEBLOS ORIGINARIOS CASEN 2011, supra note 82. 
 86. By comparison, the 2006 CASEN survey data revealed that the Indigenous 
population in Chile was just over 1 million people, constituting 6.6% of the national 
population. MINISTERIO DE PLANIFICACIÓN, GOBIERNO DE CHILE, PUEBLOS ORIGINARIOS 
CASEN 4 (2006).  The 2002 census data, which cannot be strictly compared to 2012 data 
due to changes in the questions asked, showed the Indigenous population to be 692,192 
individuals, or 4.6% of the national population. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICAS, 
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Unlike the census and CASEN data, CONADI’s numbers are not based 
on statistical methods of data collection and analysis. Instead, CONADI 
maintains a list of individuals that have been granted certificates accrediting 
them as Indigenous individuals. Applying for accreditation is a strictly 
voluntary decision and often occurs only when an Indigenous individual 
seeks access to certain types of government benefits such as scholarship 
programs, grant funding opportunities, or land titling.87 As of July 2013, 
CONADI reports that 293,890 individuals in the country have applied for 
these certificates, of which 281,568 have been issued.88 CONADI’s data on 
the number of Indigenous communities and Indigenous associations 
registered within Chile do little to clarify the exact number of Indigenous 
individuals living within Chile, but they do paint a picture of the 
enormously complex organizational quagmire found in the country. Again, 
as of July 2013, CONADI had recognized 3,392 Indigenous communities 
and 2,017 Indigenous associations.89 
The vast majority of Indigenous individuals in Chile identify as 
Mapuche—a fact that drives much of the debate over what Indigenous 
policy and law should be. Of the total Indigenous population, 86.4% or 
nearly 1.2 million people identify as Mapuche.90 The next largest 
population is the Aymara people, which make up 7.2% of the Indigenous 
population, or approximately 98,000 individuals.91 None of the remaining 
seven Indigenous peoples constitute more than 3% of the total Indigenous 
population living in Chile.92 
Over the last several decades, the Indigenous population in Chile has 
become increasingly urban. While a higher percentage of Indigenous people 
continue to live in rural areas than do non-Indigenous people, only about 
one-quarter of the total Indigenous population resides in rural areas of the 
nation.93 The trend towards urbanization is particularly great for non-
Mapuche Indigenous peoples: approximately 70%-90% of all non-Mapuche 
Indigenous populations reside in urban areas.94  The Región Metrapolitana, 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Law No. 19.253, art. 3, September 28, 1993 (Chile). 
 88. Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, supra note 83. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See PUEBLOS ORIGINARIOS CASEN 2011, supra note 82, at 2-3.  
 91. Id. at 3. 
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a region including the capital city of Santiago as well as the top ten 
municipalities in terms of Indigenous populations, has, in particular, 
absorbed a significant number of Indigenous migrants.95 
As with many Indigenous peoples around the world, the Indigenous 
peoples in Chile lag behind the general population when it comes to nearly 
any socioeconomic indicator. The following statistics offer a brief glimpse 
into some of the socioeconomic challenges the Indigenous peoples in Chile 
face:96 
 
o 19.2% of Indigenous people live in poverty and 4.3% live in 
extreme poverty, compared to 14% and 2.7%, respectively, of 
the non-Indigenous population; 
 
o 5% of the Indigenous population is illiterate, compared to 3.2% 
of the non-Indigenous population; 
 
o The average educational attainment for Indigenous people is 
ninth grade, compared to ninth grade for the non-Indigenous 
population; 
 
o While gaps in early childhood and basic education are closing, 
only 38.4% of the Indigenous population attends post-secondary 
education, compared to 45.1% of the non-Indigenous population; 
 
o 10.6% of the Indigenous population is unemployed, compared to 
7.5% of the non-Indigenous population; and 
 
o The average hourly wage for Indigenous individuals is 33% less 
than the average hourly wage for non-Indigenous people. 
 
It is important to note that the data presented above is an aggregate view 
of the Indigenous population of the country as a whole, covering all 
geographic regions as well as both urban and rural Indigenous populations. 
The reality is that there are areas where these socioeconomic gaps are much 
more pronounced.  For example, the rates of illiteracy are much higher for 
the Mapuche people, where, in some municipalities, the rate of illiteracy is 
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two to three times greater than the average level of illiteracy for Indigenous 
adults living in other regions of the country.97 Similarly, while Indigenous 
peoples average one less year of education as compared to the non-
Indigenous population, in certain Mapuche territories of southern Chile, 
that gap grows to a difference of more than two years.98 
C. The Political-Legal Environment for Self-Determination in Chile 
Indigenous rights in Chile are almost exclusively outlined in just three 
legal instruments. First, Law 19.253 (1993), commonly known as the 
“Indigenous Law,” is the oldest piece of national legislation directly 
addressing Indigenous rights and policy in Chile.99 Second, in 2008 Chile 
ratified ILO Convention 169 on indigenous and tribal peoples (Convention 
169).100 Since its ratification, Convention 169 has greatly impacted the legal 
and policy debates within the nation. Finally, Chile voted in favor of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, 
although this instrument occupies a decidedly less significant place in both 
the legal framework and in the national discourse on Indigenous rights.101 
While the importance and influence of Convention 169 increases in 
Chile, the Indigenous Law continues to define the structure of Indigenous 
rights within the nation. When the Indigenous Law was passed in 1993, it 
was considered a landmark piece of legislation because it was the first to 
                                                                                                                 
 97. COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATIN Y EL CARIBE, supra note 60, at 91. 
 98. Id. at 99. 
 99. Law No. 19.253, September 28, 1993 (Chile) (establishing norms for the protection, 
promotion and development of indigenous peoples and to create the National Indigenous 
Development Corporation). 
 100. Decree No. 236 of the Ministry of Exterior Relations (2008) (promulgating 
International Labour Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries). 
 101. U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., at 20, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 
2007) (remarks by Chile’s delegate to the United Nations during the vote on the Declaration) 
(“The delegation of Chile voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, for we recognize the important and valuable contribution of indigenous 
peoples in building and developing our societies. The Declaration is a significant step in our 
great national undertaking to build a more inclusive, diverse and tolerant society . . . .”); 
DERECHOS DE LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS, INFORME ANUAL SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE 
2008, at 361 (Universidad Diego Portales Centro de Derechos Humanos, Nicholas Espejo 
Yaksic & Marcelo Rojas Vásquez eds., 2008) [hereinafter INFORME ANUAL SOBRE DERECHOS 
HUMANOS EN CHILE 2008]. 
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comprehensively address Indigenous issues and rights in Chile’s history.102 
The Indigenous Law accomplishes a number of things, including:  
 
o recognizes the nine Indigenous “ethnicities” in Chile;103  
 
o forming the basis for the creation of CONADI (the Corporación 
Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena), the government agency 
charged with implementing—but not setting—Indigenous 
policy;104 
 
o establishing Indigenous accreditation procedures for Indigenous 
individuals;105 
 
o defining how Indigenous peoples are allowed to organize 
themselves by creating two types of legal entities—“Indigenous 
Communities” and “Indigenous Associations”;106 
 
o establishing the procedures through which Indigenous 
individuals and Indigenous Communities may: obtain title to 
ancestral lands; clear title to ancestral lands; and register 
ancestral lands as “Indigenous lands”;107 
 
o defining the special protections—for example, related to 
alienation, division, encumbrances, rent and inheritance—
afforded to “Indigenous lands”;108 
 
o allowing the government to create “Indigenous Development 
Areas” or ADI’s (Áreas de Desarrollo Indígena), which are 
geographic areas where government agencies are required to 
focus their efforts for the benefit of Indigenous peoples;109 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People: Mission to Chile, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3 (Nov. 
2003). 
 103. Law 19.253, art. 1, September 28, 1993 (Chile). 
 104. Id. at tit. VI. 
 105. Id. at tit. I. 
 106. Id. at para. 4; id. at tit. V, para. 2. 
 107. Id. at tit. II, para. 1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at tit. II, para. 2. 
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o establishing the Indigenous Development Fund and the 
Indigenous Lands and Waters Fund;110 and 
 
o defining and recognizing specific Indigenous rights related to 
culture, education, justice systems, and participation.111 
 
Although the foregoing list broadly summarizes the Indigenous Law, the 
law addresses many other complex issues affecting Indigenous peoples as 
well.  
In addition to the Indigenous Law, Convention 169 has played an 
increasingly important role in defining Indigenous rights and the state-
Indigenous relationship since its ratification by Chile in 2008.112 
Convention 169 is an international treaty, adopted by the International 
Labour Organization in 1989, and ratified by twenty-two countries.113 It is 
the only international treaty to specifically address Indigenous rights and is 
loosely based on the principle of Indigenous self-determination.114  
Convention 169 addresses many of the same substantive issues 
addressed in the Indigenous Law. Within its key provisions, the 
Convention:  
 
o defines the term “Indigenous peoples” and establishes 
Indigenous peoples as holders of collective rights;115 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. 
 111. Law No. 19.253, tit. IV, September 28, 1993 (Chile) (culture and education); Law 
No. 19.253, tit. V, September 28, 1993 (Chile) (participation); Law No. 19.253, tit. VII, 
September 28, 1993 (Chile) (judicial procedures). 
 112. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME ANUAL 2010: SITUACIÓN DE 
LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE 91-112 (2010) [hereinafter INFORME ANUAL 2010]; 
INFORME ANUAL SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE 2009, at 221-32,  (Universidad Diego 
Portales, Jorge Contesse Singh & Andrea Palet eds., 2009).  
 113. Ratifications of C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORML 
EXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014). 
 114. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17. 
 115. Article 1 of Convention 169 specifies that the Convention applies to peoples that fall 
into one of two broad categories: “tribal peoples” whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from the national community and who are regulated by their 
own customs or traditions or special laws and regulations; and peoples who are regarded as 
indigenous by virtue of having descended from populations that inhabited a geographic area 
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o recognizes and protects Indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, 
territories and natural resources;116 
 
o establishes labor and employment rights and protections for 
Indigenous peoples;117 
 
o protects and promotes Indigenous peoples’ access to health and 
education, including access to traditional health and education 
practices and institutions;118 
 
o recognizes and protects Indigenous peoples’ own representative 
institutions;119  
 
o recognizes and protects the Indigenous rights  to consultation 
and to participation, the “cornerstone” rights of the 
Convention;120 and 
 
                                                                                                                 
prior to conquest and colonization.  Under the Convention, self-identification as Indigenous 
is a fundamental factor to consider.  ILO Convention 169, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
 115. The incorporation of the term “peoples” into the Convention is significant and 
represents a clear shift in international law towards the recognition and protection of 
collective rights as distinct from individual human rights. See generally Swepston, A New 
Step, supra note 17. 
 116. ILO Convention 169, supra note 2, at arts. 13-19. 
 117. Id. at arts. 20-23. 
 118. Id. at arts. 24-31. With regards to education, for example, the Convention provides 
in Article 27 that “governments shall recognise the right of [indigenous peoples] to establish 
their own educational institutions and facilitie[s]." Id. at art. 27. 
 119. Id. at arts. 5, 8. Article 5 obligates governments to respect the “integrity of the 
values, practices and institutions” of indigenous peoples while Article 8 of Convention 169 
recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to “retain their own customs and institutions”. Id. 
 120. Id. at arts. 6-7. The right of consultation is explicitly laid out in article 6 of the 
Convention, while the right to participation is recognized in article 7 of the Convention. Id. 
These two rights additionally appear repeatedly throughout the Convention in articles 
dealing with other substantive rights. See also Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine 
the Representation Alleging Non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Made Under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the 
Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL) at para. 31 (Nov. 
14, 2001) (“The Committee considers that the spirit of consultation and participation 
constitutes the cornerstone of Convention No. 169 on which all its provisions are based.”), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::NO:50012:P50012_ 
COMPLAINT_PROCEDURE_ID,P50012_LANG_CODE:2507223,en:NO. 
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o requires nation-states to modify existing legislation and/or adopt 
new measures that fully implement Convention 169.121 
 
Because Convention 169 is a human rights treaty, it enjoys special status 
under Chilean law and supersedes other national legislation and 
regulations.122 The Chilean Constitution mandates that any legislation or 
regulation not in sync with Convention 169—or any other international 
norm Chile has agreed to adhere to—must be modified in order to comply 
with the treaty’s provisions.123 While an analysis of Chile’s compliance—or 
lack thereof—with Convention 169 is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
safe to say that Chile, like many other nations that have ratified Convention 
169, is still learning how Convention 169 fits within the broader legal 
framework.  
The final significant legal instrument operating within Chile is the 
United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the 
Declaration).124 The Declaration has received significantly less attention 
than Convention 169 within the Chilean discourse on Indigenous rights, 
largely due to international law making a clear distinction between the 
binding legal effect of “treaties” and non-binding “declarations.”125 The 
Declaration does, however, form a part of customary international law that 
                                                                                                                 
 121. ILO Convention 169, supra note 2, at arts. 2-4 (establishing general obligations for 
member states to take the necessary measures to uphold the rights recognized in the 
Convention). More specific state obligations are detailed throughout the Convention in the 
context of specific thematic areas. 
 122. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 5 (establishing that it 
is the obligation of the state to respect and promote the rights recognized in the Constitution 
and in international human rights treaties ratified by Chile). This same article establishes that 
such rights place a limit on Chile’s exercise of sovereignty. Id.; see also INFORME ANUAL 
SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE 2009, supra note 112, at 22. 
 123. Decree No. 236 of the Ministry of Exterior Relations, supra note 100; see also 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] [Constitution], art. 5. This 
position is also consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of which 
Chile is a signatory. That Convention provides in Article 27 that “[a] party may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 339. 
 124. U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., supra note 101; INFORME ANUAL SOBRE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE 2008, supra note 101, at 361. 
 125. Int’l Law Ass’n, 75th Conference, Resolution No. 5/2102, at para. 2 (Sofia, Aug. 5, 
2012) [hereinafter ILA Resolution 5/2102]; COMM. ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT (2012) [hereinafter ILA FINAL REPORT]; Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the General Assembly, supra note 4; S. 
JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 79-82 (2009). 
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Chile has promised to uphold and promote.126 Within the Declaration are 
many of the same Indigenous rights found in Convention 169, but there are 
a few significant additions as well—including the Indigenous right of self-
determination.127 The explicit mentioning of the Indigenous right of self-
determination within the Declaration means, in theory at least, that Chile is 
committed to upholding and promoting this right going forward.128 
Beyond these three foundational pieces of legislation there are a handful 
of laws and regulations that touch on specific Indigenous issues or specific 
Indigenous groups. For example, in 2008, Chile passed Law 20.249 
establishing procedures for the designation of “Original Peoples Marine 
Coastal Areas” (Espacio Costero Marino de los Pueblos Originarios),129 
which is a law primarily addresses the issue of Indigenous coastal rights.130 
                                                                                                                 
 126. In this regard, on the occasion of Chile’s vote in 2008, the representative from Chile 
said: 
The delegation of Chile voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for we recognize the important and valuable 
contribution of indigenous peoples in building and developing our societies. 
The Declaration is a significant step in our great national undertaking to build a 
more inclusive, diverse and tolerant society. In that context, we would like to 
reaffirm a crucial principle of our domestic legal system, namely, the need to 
“respect, protect and promote the development of indigenous people, including 
their culture, families and communities.” That principle underpins the public 
policies and initiatives we are promoting for the economic, social and cultural 
development of our indigenous peoples. The Declaration will serve to 
strengthen those national efforts, which are being carried out through dialogue, 
respect for our specificities, observance of our international commitments and, 
in particular, our domestic institutions, rule of law and legal norms. 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., supra note 101, at 20. 
 127. While the Convention does not explicitly reference the right of self-determination, 
the Declaration does. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 3, 
art. 3. For a general discussion of the role of the Declaration in relation to other international 
norms, see Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 2008). 
 128. ILA Resolution 5/2102, supra note 125; ILA FINAL REPORT, supra note 125; Rep. of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the General Assembly, supra 
note 4; ANAYA, supra note 125, at 79-82; Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples to the General Assembly, 
supra note 127, at paras. 34-43. 
 129. Law No. 20.249, Feb. 16, 2008 (Chile) (creating the Indigenous peoples’ marine 
coastal area). 
 130. See infra Part III (addressing law in more detail as it is the basis of the Identidad 
Territorial Lafkenche case study). 
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Similarly, in 2009, Chile’s Ministry of Planning and Development131 
promulgated Decree 124,132 a provisional regulation concerning Indigenous 
consultation and participation in certain circumstances.133  In 2014, Decree 
124 was repealed and replaced with Decree 66.134 There are also a handful 
of special laws and regulations that apply only to Easter Island, the home of 
the Rapa Nui people.135 Finally, several generally applicable laws and 
regulations contain specific articles touching on Indigenous rights across a 
range of issues, including but not limited to: education,136 environmental 
protection,137 extractive industries,138 forestry,139 health,140 and national 
parks and reserves.141  
                                                                                                                 
 131. Now known as the Ministry of Social Development. 
 132. Decreto No. 124 del Ministerio de Planificación que reglamenta el artículo 34 de la 
Ley No. 19.253 a fin de regular la consulta y la participación de los pueblos indígenas 
(2009). 
 133. Id. arts. 4-5. 
 134. Decreto No. 66 del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social que regula el procedimiento de 
consulta indígena en virtud del artículo 6 No. 1 Letra A) y No. 2 del Convenio No. 169 de la 
Organización Internacional del Trabajo y deroga normativa que indica (2014). 
 135. For example, in 2000 a decree was adopted to establish the Easter Island 
Development Commission, which provides for the participation of Rapa Nui representatives 
in development planning for the island.  Decreto No. 3 del Ministerio de Planificación y 
Cooperación que aprueba reglamento de la comisión de desarrollo de Isla de Pascua (2000). 
 136. See, e.g., Decreto No. 280 del Ministerio de Educación que establece los objetivos 
fundamentals y contentidos mínimos obligatrios de la educación básica y fija normas 
generales para su aplicación (2009).  This decree introduced the indigenous language sector 
into the national education curriculum, establishing guidelines for which schools might have 
indigenous language programs, at which grade levels, and how those programs will be 
implemented. Id. 
 137. Law No. 19.300, art. 4, January 3, 1994 (Chile) establishes that State entities, in 
carrying out their duties under the law, must promote the conservation, development and 
strengthening of Indigenous identity, languages, institutions, and social and cultural 
traditions. In addition, Chile recently adopted new regulations governing environmental 
impact assessments for large-scale development projects. These new regulations specifically 
address Indigenous consultation. See Decree 40 del Ministerio del Medio Ambiente que 
aprueba reglamento del sistema de evaluación de impacto ambiental (2013). 
 138. Extractive industries projects in Chile are subject to the environmental impact 
assessment process established in Law 19.300 and its regulation, Decree 40 del Ministerio 
del Medio Ambiente que aprueba reglamento del sistema de evaluación de impacto 
ambiental (2013). 
 139. See, e.g., Decreto Ley 701 del Ministerio de Agricultura que fija régimen legal de 
los terrenos forestales o preferentemente aptos para la forestación, y establece normas de 
fomento sobre la materia (1974). A new law governing forestry—and that also includes 
provisions relevant to Indigenous peoples—is currently being considered in Congress. 
Boletín 8603-01 (Oct. 2, 2012).    
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Before presenting and analyzing the Indigenous self-determination case 
studies from Chile, it is beneficial to point out three key differences 
between Chilean Indigenous policy and that of the United States: 
First, while the United States has a land reservation system, Chile does 
not. Indigenous peoples in Chile are still very much in the process of 
recovering their ancestral lands and resources as well as obtaining official 
legal recognition of those lands and resources.142 Although vast regions of 
Chile are generally understood to be the ancestral homelands of certain 
Indigenous communities—for example, Easter Island belonging to the Rapa 
Nui,143 or the regions extending south of the Bío Bío River belonging to the 
Mapuche144—official recognition has taken place very slowly.145 Where 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See, e.g., Law No. 20.584 que regula los derechos y deberes que tienes las personas 
en relación con acciones vinculadas a su atención en salud, art. 7 (2012) (specifying that in 
regions with a high concentration of indigenous population, public health agencies must 
protect the right of indigenous individuals to culturally appropriate health services through 
intercultural health programs that have been approved by the indigenous peoples). 
 141. See, e.g., Decreto 50 del Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo que fija 
procedimiento para otorgamiento de concesiones turísticas en áreas silvestres protegidas del 
Estado (2012) (requiring the State to consider Indigenous peoples when granting tourism 
concessions within protected areas). 
 142. INFORME ANUAL 2010, supra note 112, at 104-05; Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People: Mission to 
Chile, supra note 102; Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in 
Chile: Follow Up to the Recommendations Made by the Previous Special Rapporteur, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/12/34/Add.6 (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter Follow Up to the Recommendations 
Made by the Previous Special Rapporteur]. 
 143. See generally INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE VERDAD HISTÓRICA Y NUEVO TRATO CON 
LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS 259-63 (2008). Notably, this same government report explained the 
history of Rapa Nui’s annexation to Chile in the late 1880s through the Acuerdo de 
Voluntades. The treaty was written in both Spanish and a mix of Rapanui and Tahitian and 
this government report acknowledged for the first time the significant differences in the 
translations which raise doubts as to whether sovereignty and territorial rights were actually 
ever ceded to the Chilean state during this period of annexation.  Id. 
 144. See generally id. at 317-23. As explained in this report, the Mapuche population 
once stretched as far north as the Metropolitan Region and present-day Santiago. During the 
period of colonization, a series of parlamentos (dialogues) between the Spanish and the 
Mapuche led to the creation of a border along the Bío Bío River, to the south of which was 
autonomous Mapuche territory that was never successfully conquered by the Spanish. This 
area was only incorporated into Chile in the late 1800s during a process known as the 
Pacification of the Araucanía.  Id. 
 145. Between 1994 and 2010 a total of 667,457 hectares have been acquired and 
transferred to Indigenous individuals and communities. INFORME ANUAL 2010, supra note 
112, at 104. The estimate of the total land area that is “Indigenous” per the terms of the 
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official recognition has occurred, it frequently involves relatively small 
parcels of land that are titled to Indigenous individuals or single Indigenous 
communities. The patchwork of Indigenous lands created by Chile’s policy 
is a direct result of the nation’s Indigenous Law, which requires individuals 
and/or communities to register with the government before being eligible 
for Indigenous lands.146 Because the registration process favors smaller 
entities and explicitly forbids the formation of confederations of 
communities,147 lands recognized officially as Indigenous lands tend to be 
titled to a single family or community and tend not to be larger, contiguous 
pieces of land owned by an Indigenous people as a whole.  
Though Chile does not have a land reservation system, the nation does 
recognize Áreas de Desarrollo Indígena (Indigenous Development Areas) 
or ADIs. ADIs are designated geographic regions within which the Chilean 
government has decided to focus its attention on improving the lives of the 
Indigenous individuals living there.148 The purpose of the ADIs is not to 
establish a land base belonging to Indigenous peoples, but rather to promote 
“development” within traditional Indigenous territory.149 As of May 2013, 
there were eleven ADIs in Chile.150 Under Chilean law, an ADI may only 
                                                                                                                 
Indigenous Law exceeds 1,161,074 hectares. Id. The estimate of total Indigenous land is 
likely low given the restrictive stance of the Indigenous Law compared to international law 
principles.  See Follow Up to the Recommendations Made by the Previous Special 
Rapporteur, supra note 142, at para. 24-32.    
 146. José Aylwin, Derechos territoriales de pueblos indígenas en América Latina: 
Situación Jurídica y Políticas Públicas, OBSERVATORIO CIUDADANO, 27-31 (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.observatorio.cl/sites/default/files/biblioteca/presentacion_jose_aylwin.pdf. 
 147. According to the Indigenous Law, Article 9, a single Indigenous Community must 
be created on the basis of one of the following criteria: the members descend from the same 
family lines, the members have a shared traditional leader, the members possess or have 
possessed land in common or the members descend from the same ancient village. Law No. 
19.253, art. 9, September 28, 1993 (Chile). Regarding Indigenous Associations, the 
Indigenous Law is clearer, stating in Article 36 that Indigenous Associations may not 
represent Indigenous Communities. Id. art. 36. 
 148.  Id. arts. 26-27. 
 149. The Indigenous Law, in Article 26, defines Indigenous Development Areas as 
territorial spaces in which state administrative agencies will focalize their action for the 
“harmonious development” of Indigenous peoples and their communities. [Needs cite] 
Generally speaking, the decrees that create ADIs reference high levels of poverty, lack of 
access to employment, and various socio-economic indicators such as access to housing, 
education and healthcare and water. Id. art. 26. Development in this context is targeted at 
improving service delivery and closing the gaps between these indigenous populations and 
the general population. Id. 
 150. Currently, the following ADIs have been established by Decree of the Ministry of 
Social Development (formerly the Ministry of Planning and Development): Ercilla (Decree 
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be established where there are ancestral Indigenous lands, but the existence 
of the ADI is silent on who may hold title to ADI lands.151 Thus, ADIs can 
and do cover areas that include state-owned lands, private property, and 
Indigenous property.   
Second, Chile, unlike the United States, does not recognize any degree of 
Indigenous sovereignty. This lack of sovereignty flows naturally from the 
lack of an Indigenous land base—without land over which to exercise 
sovereignty, it is difficult to exercise any meaningful control. But even if 
Indigenous peoples in Chile had a recognized land base, the current Chilean 
explicitly rejects exercises of sovereignty by any individuals or groups of 
people other than the Chilean national government.152 Additionally, the 
legal-political framework created under Chile’s current constitution has 
resulted in a single, powerful, centralized government.153 Thus, unlike the 
United States’ tradition of federalism with a national government of limited 
powers and multiple sovereigns, Chile’s legal-political framework has all 
but eliminated the space for any co-sovereign entity to act. 
Third, whereas the United States explicitly allows for, and promotes, 
Native nation governments, Chile does not recognize any Indigenous 
entity—whether it is an Indigenous Community or an Indigenous 
Association—as a government. This difference is, of course, closely related 
to the fact that Chile does not identify Indigenous peoples as having any 
sovereign status.154 Although Chile does not acknowledge any Indigenous 
entity as a government, Indigenous individuals and communities can choose 
to organize under the Indigenous Law as “Indigenous Communities” or as 
“Indigenous Associations.”155  
Indigenous Communities are a type of Chilean legal entity formed on the 
basis of community members sharing an ancestral lineage, recognizing a 
traditional leader, having overlapping traditional land occupation, and/or 
descending from the same ancient settlement.156 Chilean law forbids 
                                                                                                                 
67 of 2013); Cabo de Hornos (Decree 279 of 2006); Alto Andino Arica-Parinacota (Decree 
224 of 2005); Rapa Nui (Decree 111 of 2004); Puel Nahuelbuta (Decree 168 of 2004); Alto 
El Loa (Decree 189 of 2003); Lago Lleu Lleu (Decree 60 of 2001); Jiwasa Oraje (Decree 67 
of 2001); Lago Budi (Decree 71 of 1997); Algo Bío Bío (Decree 93 of 1997); and Atacama 
La Grande (Decree 70 of 1997). 
 151. Law No. 19.253, art. 26. 
 152. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 5. 
 153. DESAFÍOS PARA UNA CIUDADANÍA PLENA EN CHILE HOY at 11-23 (Jorge Rowlands & 
José Aylwin eds., 2012). 
 154. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 5. 
 155. Law No. 19.253, arts. 9, 36. 
 156. Id. art. 9. 
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Indigenous Communities from banding together and forming federations.157 
Thus, the law’s definition necessitates that Indigenous Communities are 
extremely local entities with small membership numbers. The requirements 
for forming an Indigenous Community, selecting leadership, and making 
decisions are all carefully spelled out by law.158 Once formed, Indigenous 
Communities have legal personality and can enter into contracts, own 
assets, seek and administer government subsidies, and take legal action on 
behalf of the Community’s interests, among other things.159 However, given 
that the Communities are not “governments” vested with “sovereign” 
powers, Communities do not have legislative or regulatory authority; nor 
would they have the authority to enforce any legislative or regulatory action 
if they were to take it. In other words, a Community’s power over its 
members relies on those members’ personal choice to belong to the 
Community and to voluntarily consent to any Community action. 
Despite the limited powers Indigenous Communities possess within the 
Chilean legal system, Indigenous Communities most closely approximate 
the role of United States Native nations. Generally, after recognizing an 
Indigenous Community, the Chilean government considers the Community 
entity to be the primary representative institution for the Indigenous 
individuals who fit within the Community’s scope of membership.160  
The “Indigenous Association” is the primary alternative to organizing as 
an Indigenous Community. Rather than being formed around a common 
ancestry, traditional leadership structure, or traditional settlement, 
Indigenous Associations are formed on the basis of a particular thematic 
interest.161 For example, there are many Indigenous Associations created for 
the purpose of promoting Indigenous education, health, or language. By 
their nature, Indigenous Associations are more commonly formed in urban 
areas where Indigenous individuals from diverse geographic areas and from 
different traditions can join together to address issues of common interest. 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. arts. 9, 36. 
 159. Id. 
 160. For example, the most recent round of nationwide consultation sessions announced 
by the government invited Indigenous communities and associations recognized pursuant to 
the Indigenous law to participate. CONSULTA INDÍGENA, http://www.consultaindigena.gob.cl/ 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2014).  In addition, newly passed Decree 66, which regulates 
consultation in Chile, states that Indigenous peoples shall define their own representative 
institutions for purposes of consultations but also specifically references communities and 
associations recognized under the Indigenous Law as likely representative institutions. 
Decree No. 66, art. 6 (2014). 
 161. Law No. 19.253, art. 36. 
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Just like Indigenous Communities, Indigenous Associations lack legislative, 
regulatory, or judicial authority over both members and non-members. 
Indigenous Associations do enjoy legal personality and can enter into 
contracts, own assets (excluding Indigenous land), receive government 
funding, and commence legal action on behalf of their members. 
Participation in an Indigenous Association is strictly voluntary.162 
Furthermore, Indigenous Associations cannot represent the interests of a 
community nor act as the representative institution for a group of 
communities.163 In practice, however, there are a few examples of 
Indigenous Associations that effectively act as umbrella organizations for 
coordination among multiple communities.164 
III. Indigenous Self-Determination in Chile 
In Part III, we have selected three stories of Indigenous self-
determination to share and have laid out each story similarly: first, we 
present some basic background on the community involved; next, we 
explain each community’s self-determination goal and the steps taken to 
achieve it; and finally, we analyze each community’s actions for evidence 
of the applicability of the Nation Building principles. 
A. Case Study Number One: The Valle de la Luna Indigenous Association 
1. Background 
The Atacama Desert covers a vast amount of land in present-day Chile, 
including the area known as the Antofagasta Region. It is a harsh and 
remote landscape rising from the Pacific Ocean towards the peaks of the 
Andes, and including the international boundary point where Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Chile meet. The landscape is dotted with huge salt flats, unique 
geologic formations, dozens of active volcanoes, bofedales (or high-altitude 
wetlands), thermal hot springs, and small waterways that open to oases of 
vegetation.165 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. arts. 36-37; Law no. 19.418 que establece normas sobre juntas de vecinos y 
demas organizaciones comunitarias, Oct. 9, 1995 (Chile). 
 163. Law No. 19.253, art. 36. 
 164. See, e.g., discussion infra regarding the Consejo de Pueblos Atcameños, and 
Identidad Territorial Lafkenche. 
 165. Decree of the Ministry of Social Development No. 70 (Chile 1997) [hereinafter 
Decree 70]. 
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Despite its remote location and unforgiving environment, the Atacama 
Desert of northern Chile has been home to the Likan Antai166 Indigenous 
people for over ten thousand years.167 The Likan Antai people’s presence in 
the region pre-dates the Chilean state, the arrival of Spanish settlers, and 
even the expansion of the Inca Empire into present-day Chile.168 
Historically, the Likan Antai people engaged in a range of economic and 
subsistence activities including farming, herding, hunting, mining, and 
trading.169 
Today, the total Likan Antai population in Chile is between 6,100170 and 
23,000171 depending on what data is used to make the determination. The 
vast majority of Likan Antai individuals — approximately 75%-90% — 
live in the Antofagasta Region of Chile.172 There are thirty-five legally-
recognized Indigenous Communities and ninety-four legally-recognized 
Indigenous Associations, nearly all of which are Likan Antai in nature.173 
Geographically speaking, many of the Likan Antai communities are located 
precisely where their ancestors settled thousands of years prior.174 
Although the Likan Antai were contacted by the Spanish in the sixteenth 
century and became a part of the Chilean state in the nineteenth century, 
they remained relatively isolated from the non-Indigenous population until 
the 1980s.175 This relative isolation dramatically changed in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s when the “tourism boom” came to the area.176 The tourism 
boom centered on the small town of San Pedro de Atacama, which lies 
along the San Pedro River Valley.177 In the past, visitors to San Pedro de 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Oftentimes referred to as the “Atacameño” people.  
 167. SEELAU & SEELAU, THE PUKARÁ OF QUITOR, supra note 13, at 7. 
 168. LAUTARO NÚÑEZ, VIDA Y CULTURA EN EL OASIS DE SAN PEDRO DE ATACAMA 17-70 
(1991). 
 169. Id. at 17-78. 
 170. CENSO 2012: RESULTADOS XVIII CENSO DE POBLACIÓN, supra note 81, at 172. 
 171. PUEBLOS ORIGINARIOS CASEN 2011, supra note 82 (stating that Likan Antai are 
1.7% of the total Indigenous population of 1,369,000). 
 172. Id. (stating that 16,000 of 23,000 Likan Antai individuals live in the Antofagasta 
Region); CENSO 2012: RESULTADOS XVIII CENSO DE POBLACIÓN, supra note 81, at 172, 177 
(2012) (stating that 5,338 of 6,101 Likan Antai individuals live in the Antofagasta Region). 
 173. Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, supra note 83. 
 174. See generally NÚÑEZ, supra note 168; COMISIONADO PRESIDENCIAL PARA ASUNTOS 
INDÍGENAS DE CHILE, INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE VERDAD HISTÓRICAL Y NUEVO TRATO CON 
LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS 139-92 (2008) [hereinafter INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE VERDAD 
HISTÓRICAL Y NUEVO TRATO CON LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS]. 
 175. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 131-39. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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Atacama were greeted with a large variety of geographical features and 
beautiful landscapes, but no lodging establishments. San Pedro de Atacama 
sported only a handful of restaurants, and almost nothing in the way of 
tourism infrastructure.178 Within only a few years, however, non-Indigenous 
entrepreneurs and corporations seized the opportunity to develop the area 
and brought with them hostels, hotels, restaurants, and tourist agencies 
offering excursions to the area’s many archaeological, cultural, geological 
and historical attractions.179 In less than a quarter of a century, more than 
215,000 tourists from around the world visit San Pedro de Atacama and the 
surrounding area annually—making it one of the most popular tourist areas 
in all of Chile.180 
For the Likan Antai people, the tourism boom has created many 
problems. First, many of the attractions visitors come to see, from thermal 
hot springs to the Atacama Salt Flat to the eight-hundred-year-old stone 
fortresses, are located on Likan Antai ancestral lands, and are sites that hold 
both cultural and historical significance for the Likan Antai people.181 
Second, the tourism industry has grown so quickly that it has largely 
outpaced meaningful regulation.182 Thus, for many, many years, tourist 
agencies had no limits on the number of people they could bring to cultural 
sites and no restrictions on how tourists behaved once at those sites.183 This 
has resulted in significant theft and vandalism of cultural property over the 
years.184 Third, the Likan Antai people are receive essentially none of the 
economic benefits of the tourism industry even though it is all takes place 
within their ancestral territory.185 Instead, the money flows to the non-
Indigenous, private businesses established to cater to tourists.186 
  
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. at 137. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Turismo, Informe Anual 2012 at 52 (May 2013) 
(reporting that over 218,000 tourists visited the Los Flamencos Reserve in 2012).  
 181. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 137-38. 
 182. R. Bushell & J. Salazar, Estudio de prefactibilidad: Turismo indígena en San Pedro 
de Atacama Chile at 24-26 (Fundación Minera Escondida, 2009). 
 183. R. Bushell & J. Salazar, Estudio de prefactibilidad: Turismo indígena en San Pedro 
de Atacama Chile at 24-26 (Fundación Minera Escondida, 2009). 
 184. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 137. 
 185. See generally IVONNE VALENZUELA, MODELO DE GESTIÓN ASOCIATIVO EN LA 
RESERVA NACIONAL LOS FLAMENCOS: UNA DÉCADA DE APRENDIZAJES (2005). 
 186. See generally id. 
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2. Self-Determination in Action 
The communities knew that something needed to be done to preserve 
their lands, resources and their cultural patrimony, and the opportunity to 
do so arose in connection with an area of land known as the Reserva 
Nacional Los Flamencos (Los Flamencos). Los Flamencos is a national 
reserve comprised of seven non-contiguous plots that together encompass: 
archeological sites; forested areas; high-altitude lakes; thermal hot springs; 
three salt flats; and Valle de la Luna (Valley of the Moon), an area of 
geologic interest within the Cordillera de la Sal (Salt Mountain Range) just 
outside the town of San Pedro de Atacama.187 Los Flamencos is located 
entirely within the comuna (commune) of San Pedro de Atacama.188 It was 
created in 1990 by decree of the Ministry of Agriculture.189 Legally 
speaking, control and administration of Los Flamencos falls to the 
Corporación Nacional Forestal (National Forestry Corporation), or 
CONAF, which is the government entity that oversees all protected areas in 
Chile.190 
Los Flamencos was created prior to the passage of the Indigenous Law, 
meaning there were no legal protections in place for Indigenous peoples’ 
rights at the time of its formation.191 Thus, although Los Flamencos is 
located entirely within the ancestral land base of the Likan Antai people, 
the Likan Antai were neither involved in the reserve’s creation nor in the 
early years of its administration and management.192 Although formal 
recognition of Indigenous peoples rights had not yet occurred, the Likan 
Antai organized to take action as best they could under the law.193 
Specifically, the Likan Antai communities organized as juntas de vecinos 
(neighborhood associations).194 These neighborhood associations were not 
Indigenous-specific identities, but the Likan Antai communities were able 
to use them to interact with local government authorities.195 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Decree 50 que crea reserva nacional Los Flamencos en terrenos fiscales de la II 
región y la declara lugar de interés científico para efectos mineros (Ministerio de Agricultura 
de Chile, Oct. 17, 1990). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. art. 6. 
 191. Decree 50 was passed in 1990 and the Indigenous Law was passed in 1993. 
 192. VALENZUELA, supra note 185, at 1-22. 
 193. INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE VERDAD HISTÓRICAL Y NUEVO TRATO CON LOS 
PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS, supra note 174, at 181-91. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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When Chile passed the Indigenous Law in 1993, new opportunities for 
Indigenous peoples to organize and assert their rights opened up.196 The 
Likan Antai communities surrounding San Pedro de Atacama took 
advantage of these opportunities and began the process of forming 
Indigenous Communities under the terms of that law shortly after its 
passage.197 Today, in the comuna (commune) of San Pedro de Atacama, 
there are seventeen Likan Antai Indigenous Communities.198 In the mid-
1990s, these communities came together to create the Consejo de Pueblos 
Atacameños or Council of Atacameño People (Consejo), an Indigenous 
Association created in accordance with the Indigenous Law.199  The 
Consejo enabled and continues to enable the communities to collaborate on 
certain projects and to coordinate decision-making and planning within the 
ancestral territory.200 
In 1997, another legal development occurred that helped pave the way 
for the Likan Antai communities to assert control over their ancestral 
territory.201 In that year, Chile’s Ministry of Planning and Cooperation 
created the first Indigenous Development Area (ADI), Atacama La 
Grande.202 The boundaries of Atacama La Grande precisely coincide with 
the boundaries of the San Pedro de Atacama comuna and thus, Los 
Flamencos was suddenly entirely encompassed within the ADI.203 The 
creation of Atacama La Grande was significant for three reasons.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 196. Law No. 19.253 (1993). 
 197. INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE VERDAD HISTÓRICAL Y NUEVO TRATO CON LOS 
PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS, supra note 174, at 187-91. 
 198. According to data from CONADI, there are thirty-five Indigenous communities 
organized through the San Pedro de Atacama Indigenous Affairs Office. This includes some 
Quechua communities as well as Likan Antai communities in the comunas of Calama and 
Ollagüe. Conversations with Likan Antai leaders who serve on the Consejo de Pueblos 
Atacameños confirm that there are seventeen communities that participate in the Consejo 
within the Atacama La Grande ADI. 
 199. At the time of its creation, the Consejo included not only the communities in San 
Pedro de Atacama, but also in the neighboring comuna of Ollagüe. Today, the Consejo has 
two divisions, one for San Pedro de Atacama and one for Calama-Ollague. 
 200. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 132-33; Sergio 
Avendaño, Áreas de desarrollo indígena en el norte de Chile: Negociaciones y disputas en 
torno a espacios territoriales 114-16 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished M.S.S. thesis, Universidad de 
Chile Facultad de Ciencias Sociales), available at http://www.tesis.uchile.cl/tesis/uchile/ 
2009/cs-avendano_s/pdfAmont/cs-avendano_s.pdf. 
 201. Decree 70, supra note 165. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
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First, the Indigenous Law specifies that: 
in the administration of wilderness protected areas, located 
within Indigenous Development Areas, the participation of the 
communities there shall be considered. The National Forestry 
Corporation . . . and [CONADI], by common agreement, will 
determine in each case the appropriate form and extent of 
Indigenous Communities’ participation as it relates to rights of 
use.204   
Although not clearly spelled out in any policy directive, nor supported by 
any prior experiences of the Chilean government, this mandate served to 
open the door to the possibility that the Likan Antai communities might be 
involved to some degree in the management of Los Flamencos.205 
Second, the decree creating Atacama La Grande acknowledged that the 
ADI “constitutes a territory that has ancestrally been inhabited by 
[I]ndigenous communities of [A]tacameño ethnicity,” and officially noted 
archeological and historical evidence tracing Likan Antai occupation of the 
lands back to at least the sixteenth century.206  The decree also 
acknowledged that the current Likan Antai communities historically 
occupied and possessed the lands in question, and noted the close 
relationship between the communities and their lands and resources.207 
While such words do not constitute an official recognition of Likan Antai 
land rights, they nonetheless serve an important role in providing a 
foundation for the communities’ interest in being involved in the 
management of Los Flamencos. 
Finally, the creation of the Atacama La Grande, ADI increased dialogue 
and cooperation between the Likan Antai Indigenous Communities and 
various Chilean government agencies.208 As is often the case, once dialogue 
started happening more consistently, positive results—for both the Likan 
Antai communities and the Chilean government—soon followed.209 
                                                                                                                 
 204. Law No. 19.253, art. 35, September 28, 1993 (Chile). (“En la administración de las 
áreas silvestres protegidas, ubicadas en las áreas de desarrollo indígena, se considerará la 
participación de las comunidades ahí existentes. La Corporación Nacional Forestal…y la 
Corporación, de común acuerdo, determinarán en cada caso la forma y alcance de la 
participación sobre los derechos de uso que en aquellas áreas corresponda a las 
Comunidades Indígenas.”) (English translation by authors). 
 205. VALENZUELA, supra note 185, at 7, 20-21. 
 206. Decree 70, supra note 165 (English translation by authors). 
 207. Id. 
 208. VALENZUELA, supra note 185, at 23. See generally Avendaño, supra note 200. 
 209. VALENZUELA, supra note 185, at 23. See generally Avendaño, supra note 200. 
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It was within this legal and political framework that negotiations 
between CONADI, CONAF, and the Indigenous Communities in San Pedro 
de Atacama came to pass.210 During these negotiations the Likan Antai 
indicated a desire to be involved in park operations and management. 
Ultimately, CONAF signed co-administration agreements with a number of 
Likan Antai communities located within or near one of the seven sectors of 
Los Flamencos.211 The first agreement, signed in 1998, was an agreement 
between the Chilean government and the Indigenous Community of 
Coyo.212 The agreement enabled Coyo to assume the on-site administration 
of an archeological site of great significance called the Aldea de Tulor 
(Village of Tulor).213  Building off of this first agreement, six Indigenous 
Communities came together to form the Valle de la Luna Indigenous 
Association in 2002.214 This group of communities ultimately signed a 
contract with CONAF to administer the largest and most-visited sector of 
Los Flamencos, an area of geological wonders known as Valle de la 
Luna.215 In the following years, the Indigenous Community of Socaire 
assumed authority over two high-altitude lakes;216 the Indigenous 
Community of Solor assumed administration of a group of lakes within the 
nearby salt flats;217 and the Indigenous Community of Toconao took control 
of a tourist site within the Salar de Atacama (Atacama Salt Flat).218 Other 
Indigenous Communities—communities not directly adjacent to one of the 
sectors of Los Flamencos—were motivated by the success of these efforts 
and began developing projects within their own communities. For example, 
the Indigenous Community of Quitor signed an agreement with the 
National Monument Council to assume control over the Pukará of Quitor—
an ancient fortress and site of great cultural and historical value.219 
Today, the Indigenous Communities that oversee the day-to-day 
operations of many sites within Los Flamencos.220 The Indigenous 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See generally VALENZUELA, supra note 185. 
 211. Id. at 39-52. 
 212. IVONNE VALENZUELA V, CORPORACIÓN NACIONAL FORESTAL, MODELO DE GESTIÓN 
ASOCIATIVO EN LA RESERVA NACIONAL LOS FLAMENCOS: UNA DÉCADA DE APRENDIZAJES 39 
(2005).  
 213. VALENZUELA, supra note 185, at 39. 
 214. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 142-43. 
 215. Id. at 143. 
 216. Id.. 
 217. Id. at 145. 
 218. Id. at 143. 
 219. SEELAU & SEELAU, THE PUKARÁ OF QUITOR, supra note 13, at 7. 
 220. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 143-48. 
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Communities set and collect admissions fees, provide park rangers, 
establish park rules and regulations, and provide for general park 
maintenance.221 Over the years, using income generated from the sites in 
conjunction with other funding sources, the Likan Antai communities have 
built museums, signage, trails, visitor centers, and other infrastructure.222 
The communities employ their own members to work on-site or behind the 
scenes—training many of these members in fields like business, 
conservation, cultural history and tourism.223 More recently, at Valle de la 
Luna, the Valle de la Luna Indigenous Association has started its own 
“special interest” tours through which visitors can participate in astronomy 
programs focused on southern hemisphere and Likan Antai astronomy, and 
caving tours focused on the mining history of the Likan Antai people.224 
Many Likan Antai communities now operate with business operation plans, 
strategic plans, and have new ideas and projects on the horizon.225 While 
most of the communities’ work has focused on tourism administration, 
there is an increasing amount of involvement in conservation and land 
management, and a hope that involvement in broader management areas 
will steadily grow in years to come.226 
Through the use of co-administration agreements, the Likan Antai 
communities have been able to respond to many of the problems the sudden 
burst of large-scale tourism ventures brought to the area.227 While the 
communities still do not have title to their ancestral lands, they have a 
stronger voice in how those lands are managed.228 Through years of hard 
work—often butting up against the wishes of the private sector—the 
communities have successfully established some level of control and 
protection over the sites that are so significant to them.229 In exercising this 
control, the communities also reap some of the economic benefits that the 
growth of the tourism industry has brought and use these benefits to expand 
their reach and take care of their own people.230 
  
                                                                                                                 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 148-50. 
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 224. Id. at 150. 
 225. Id. at 143-50. 
 226. Id. at 151-58. 
 227. Id. at 148-50. 
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3. Nation Building Principles 
Despite the success of the co-administration arrangements—from the 
perspectives of the communities as well as the Chilean government—these 
types of agreements have not been replicated to the same extent anywhere 
else within Chile.231 The lack of similar agreements remains true even 
though ten other ADIs and at least eighteen protected wilderness areas 
overlap with ancestral Indigenous lands throughout Chile.232 An important 
question to answer then is: Why were the Likan Antai people able to create 
a relationship with the Chilean government and take meaningful control 
over many of their cultural, historical, and sacred sites, when similar 
relationships have not emerged in other contexts? The Nation Building 
principles offer some possible answers to this difficult question. 
One possible explanation for the Likan Antai communities’ success is 
found in the Nation Building principle of practical sovereignty or self-rule. 
In this case, practical sovereignty can be seen in the Indigenous 
Communities’ ability to administer and manage their traditional sites 
through the co-administration agreements with the Chilean government. 
Co-administration in Los Flamencos, however, depended on a confluence 
of legal and political factors. Legally, the Indigenous Law’s mandate for 
Indigenous participation and the subsequent creation of Atacama La 
Grande ADI converged to provide a backdrop for the Likan Antai people’s 
assertions of self-determination and land rights.233 Politically, the existence 
of the ADI meant greater coordination of public funding and programming 
for the benefit of Indigenous peoples.234 These factors combined so that 
Indigenous peoples, for the first time under Chilean law, had a real 
opportunity to exercise control over portions of their ancestral territory.235 
The mere existence of legal and political space to exercise some level of 
practical sovereignty, however, has proven insufficient to produce results. 
Throughout Chile, many Indigenous Communities had opportunities to act 
in a manner similar to the Likan Antai people, but have not.236  Why is this? 
The answer to this question may stem from another Nation Building 
principle—public-spirited leadership. The Chilean government—through 
statements made by CONAF officials—has indicated that the success of the 
                                                                                                                 
 231. VALENZUELA, supra note 185, at 3-4. 
 232. Id. at 5. 
 233. Law No. 19.253, art. 35, September 28, 1993 (Chile); Decree 70, supra note 165. 
 234. See generally VALENZUELA, supra note 185. 
 235. Seelau & Seelau, Protegiendo sus territorios, supra note 13, at 151-60. 
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Likan Antai communities should be replicable in other regions of Chile.237 
When asked why, then, is Los Flamencos one of the only true examples of 
government-Indigenous collaboration, the answer frequently focuses on 
community leadership.238 The leaders of the various Likan Antai 
communities are known for being very pro-active.239 In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, community leadership spoke out about the need to do 
something—anything—to stop the destruction of their lands and culture by 
the booming tourism industry.240 Although their options were initially 
limited, leaders united their people and formed neighborhood associations 
to try and gain some control.241 As the Chilean legal framework developed 
to include the Indigenous Law, the Los Flamencos reserve, and the 
Atacama La Grande ADI, additional opportunities presented themselves.242 
Again, the leaders united their communities and took action. The actions 
were small to begin with, but once the Likan Antai community leaders had 
their collective foot in the door, they were able to build on small successes 
and prove to everyone—most especially the Chilean government—that they 
could be trusted with more and more responsibility.243 The takeaway, 
perhaps, is that the communities and their leaders did not wait for the 
Chilean government to come to them; they started doing what they could to 
protect their sites even before any agreements were signed. Specifically, the 
community leaders refused to wait for Chile to make a “perfect” offer—i.e. 
an offer to return all land rights to the Likan Antai communities—and they 
refused to do nothing until Chile responds to their (still pending) land rights 
claims.244 Instead, the communities’ leadership acted with practical 
sovereignty and seized the opportunity that was in front of them. 
In the end, however, even the Likan Antai communities’ strong 
leadership coupled with space for self-rule likely would not have achieved 
as much as it has without effective institutions—another one of the Nation 
Building principles. As discussed previously, the Likan Antai communities 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Id. at 60-64. 
 238.  Interview with Gorge Retamal, Regional Director, CONAF-Antofagasta (Apr. 18, 
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in San Pedro de Atacama have a long, stable history of organization.245 
Beginning in the 1980s, the communities organized as neighborhood 
associations, and while some of these associations continue to operate, the 
various communities also organized under the Indigenous Law as 
Indigenous Communities and Indigenous Associations to better advance 
their visions for the future.246 The decision to form legally-recognized 
entities under Chilean law allowed the Likan Antai communities to both 
enter into agreements with the government and to access essential 
government funding used to begin the various co-administration projects.247  
Beyond the actions of the individual communities, the role of an 
effective and stable decision-making institution is most clearly seen in the 
Valle de la Luna Indigenous Association. Unlike other legally-recognized 
Indigenous entities within Chile, the Valle de la Luna Indigenous 
Association is a governing institution comprised of six communities, which 
have come together for the purpose of managing the Valle de la Luna 
site.248 It took planning and time to create a functioning inter-community 
governing institution, but the Likan Antai people knew that they would 
never regain control over the Valle de la Luna ancestral lands if they did not 
do so.249 Ultimately, the institutional structure includes a representative 
from each of the six communities involved, but overall the Valle de la Luna 
Indigenous Association operates autonomously and is relatively isolated 
from the political issues that can arise at the individual community level.250 
Under Chilean law, Indigenous Communities typically hold elections every 
two years, meaning the leadership of a community can change 
drastically.251 But having six community leaders sitting on one governing 
body helps cull that kind of complete and sudden turnover.252 Additionally, 
the Valle de la Luna Indigenous Association has a full-time employee who 
serves as “administrator” of the legal entity.253 The administrator position 
helps create a long-term institutional memory and further promotes 
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stability.254 Finally, the Valle de la Luna Indigenous Association has 
become an effective and stable governing institution, in part, because its 
members have worked hard over the past ten years to formalize internal 
procedures for future governing members.255 
A final hallmark of the Likan Antai communities’ successes can be 
explained by another Nation Building principle—strategic planning. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Likan Antai story is that it started 
with very small steps, and through the aid of a long-term vision and a plan 
for achieving that vision, it grew into something much more robust. When 
the Likan Antai communities began entering into co-administration 
agreements concerning their traditional sites, each and every community 
established a clearly defined vision for the future of the site they were put in 
charge of.256 These visions, or site plans, were guided by some very basic 
principles: conservation and protection of their ancestral lands, and 
promotion of Likan Antai culture and history.257 While the site plans vary 
from community to community, they routinely address both immediate and 
long-term goals.258 For example, when the Indigenous Community of 
Quitor signed its co-administration agreement and was placed in charge of 
the nearby Pukará—a traditional stone fortress—their first goal was simply 
to setup a table at the entrance to the fortress and collect a modest 
admission fee.259 Over the long-term, their goals—all of which were 
achieved within a decade—included the construction of bathrooms, a 
visitor’s center, a museum, paths, signs and a first-aid center.260 One by one 
the Indigenous Community of Quitor stuck with their long-term plan and 
achieved their initial set of goals.261 Likewise, the Valle de la Luna 
Indigenous Association worked to create more formal declarations of their 
strategic plan.262 The Association has worked over the years to produce a 
formal development plan, an operating plan, an annual budget, and a project 
portfolio.263 These documents are used to prioritize projects, monitor 
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progress on various projects, and serve as the basis for making any 
adjustments to the strategic plan that may be necessary.264 
The efforts of the Likan Antai people, through the Valle de la Luna 
Indigenous Association and through their own community efforts, are 
nothing short of impressive. In the span of twenty years, the Likan Antai 
people went from being victims of outside encroachment on their territory 
to a community actively re-gaining control over that same territory. Their 
efforts are clearly self-determination in action and are a compelling 
example that the Nation Building principles have applicability outside the 
British colonial context. 
B. Case Study Number Two: Mapu Lahual Community Parks Network 
1. Background 
The Mapuche people are the most populous Indigenous group in Chile, 
accounting for over one million individuals and over 85% of the total 
Indigenous population.265 Within the Mapuche people group are a number 
of sub-groups,266 which are not treated or counted as separate Indigenous 
peoples by the Chilean government.267 But the Mapuche sub-groups have 
played, and continue to play, a strong role in how individuals and 
communities identify themselves and organize themselves. The Mapuche 
sub-groups are defined in reference to their geographic location and, among 
others, include: the Huilliche (people of the south); the Lafkenche (people 
of the coast); the Pehuenche (people of the mountains); and the Pikunche 
(people of the north).268 
Historically, the Huilliche people occupied a vast area of land stretching 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Andes Mountains and extending from the 
southern portion of the Araucanía Region through parts of the Los Lagos 
Region, including the large island of Chiloé.269 Today, many Huilliche 
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communities continue to exist within this traditional territory.270 According 
to the Chilean government, more than one thousand Indigenous 
Associations and Communities are registered in the area.271 The traditional 
Huilliche homeland is known for its plentiful lakes and rivers, and for the 
temperate rain forests that cover much of the land.272 Chilean roads end in 
the southern portion of Huilliche territory and give way to glacier fields and 
the Patagonian wilderness.273 In terms of development, the traditional 
Huilliche homeland is where some of Chile’s largest hydroelectric projects, 
massive logging operations, salmon fisheries and cellulose plants are 
located.274 Portions of the territory are also popular tourist destinations.275  
Similar to other Indigenous peoples in Chile, the Huilliche people have 
long struggled to gain legal protection for their lands and natural resources. 
Their demands frequently have come into conflict with the interests of the 
industries that serve as the economic engine for southern Chile.276 Faced 
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with these challenges, a small group of Huilliche communities have come 
together over the past decade to develop the Red de Parques Comunitarios 
Mapu Lahual (Mapu Lahual Community Parks Network).277 The Red de 
Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual is an innovative approach to 
protecting Huilliche land rights, exercising control over traditional 
Huilliche territory, conserving native forests, and bringing much-needed 
development to Huilliche communities.278 
2. Self-Determination in Action 
The Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual is a project involving 
nine Huilliche Indigenous Communities and is located between the Pacific 
Ocean and the Cordillera de la Costa (Coastal Mountain Range), west of 
the city of Osorno in the Los Lagos Region.279 The name, Mapu Lahual, 
means “land of the larch trees” and is descriptive of the local landscape, 
which is home to the larch tree—a native species to the area that is 
protected under Chilean law.280 In total, the network of parks includes seven 
community parks within the sixty thousand hectares of land considered to 
be the communities’ ancestral territory.281 
Although the Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual did not open 
until 2001, the seeds for its creation were planted in 1998.282 In that year, 
several Huilliche communities collaborated with the Chilean government 
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on a project designed to protect native forests.283 The specifics of the 
project included involving local Huilliche communities in forest fire 
prevention efforts and in monitoring the area to prevent illegal cutting of 
protected native species.284 In addition to the stated goals of the project, two 
other benefits came out of this collaboration: first, the project raised 
awareness among the Huilliche people of the need to protect their 
traditional natural resources; and second, the project provided opportunities 
for disperse Huilliche communities to come together and discuss shared 
issues.285 
Ultimately, the native species protection project led the Huilliche people 
to start their own program geared towards sustainable development and 
forestry management within their own communities.286 This project 
required funding, which was obtained from the government for a period of 
four years.287 During these four years, the communities had the opportunity 
to form a permanent working group amongst themselves and gain valuable 
experience interacting with both governmental agencies and environmental 
groups operating in the area.288 
Having built up capacity in the area of conservation and forestry 
management, the Huilliche community of Maicolpi took the next step and 
created a park in 2000. This would be the first park of the Red de Parques 
Comunitarios Mapu Lahual.289 The Huilliche community of Maicolpi 
created this park through a joint funding program involving the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Comité Nacional Pro Defensa de la Flora y 
Fauna (National Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna or 
CODEFF), a Chilean environmental NGO.290 The park was designed to be a 
pilot project that, if successful, would result in the creation of additional 
parks in other Huilliche communities.291 
It became evident very early on that the Maicolpi park project was going 
to be a success, and so the Huilliche communities quickly began taking 
steps to build on that success.292 Working together, a group of Huilliche 
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communities wrote a proposal for continued WWF-CODEFF funding.293 
This funding proposal suggested the creation of a temporary organizational 
structure that sought a balance between local and centralized control of 
future park development.294 Under the proposal—which was eventually 
granted—each individual community worked to develop its own park, but 
all the individual community efforts were overseen and coordinated by a 
commission composed of: the presidents of each Huilliche community; a 
member of the Junta General de Caciques (a council of traditional 
Huilliche leaders), and representatives from three government agencies—
CONADI, CONAF and Servicio Nacional de Turismo or SERNATUR 
(National Tourism Service).295 The commission was charged with 
managing finances, overseeing technical assistance for the communities, 
and drafting the organizational documents necessary for the formation of a 
new Indigenous Association that would manage the park system.296 
As a result of these efforts, the Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu 
Lahual was born in 2001.297 Within the next year an Indigenous 
Association named Mapu Lahual of Butahuillimapu was legally formed 
under the Indigenous Law.298 In the years that followed its formation, 
funding and technical assistance from CONAF, SERNATUR, and WWF, 
helped build the Huilliche communities’ capacities so that they were able 
to: strengthen their institutions; incorporate another community into the 
network; expand the services offered to tourists visiting the parks; and 
improve upon conservation and management plans.299 
More than a decade later the Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual 
is an undisputed success and a glowing example of Indigenous self-
determination within Chile. As a testament to the parks’ success, in 2007, 
Chile awarded the Huilliche communities the Bicentennial Seal for their 
accomplishments in local governance and sustainable living.300 In 2011, 
during the International Year of Forests, the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization recognized the Huilliche communities as an 
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example for the entire South America continent of a successful forestry 
management project.301 
Today, the Huilliche communities participating in the Red de Parques 
Comunitarios Mapu Lahual offer an impressive array of services to 
individuals who visit their ancestral territory.302 Although each park in the 
network is different—reflecting the differences between the land and the 
Huilliche communities themselves—together, the participating 
communities offer activities such as boating, camping, fishing, guided 
tours, hiking, and horseback riding.303 Additionally, food and lodging is 
available in the area and is provided either by community-operated 
establishments or by individual Mapuche families.304 Ultimately, visitors to 
the Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual not only have an 
opportunity to visit one of Chile’s most unique environmental habitats, but 
also have the chance to immerse themselves in the Huilliche way of life and 
learn about Huilliche culture, history, and values. 
3. Nation Building Principles 
As with the Likan Antai communities, the Huilliche communities’ 
experiences illustrate the Nation Building principles in action. The Red de 
Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual would never be possible without the 
principle of practical self-rule. The Huilliche communities recognized a 
number of problems in their communities—lack of economic development, 
lack of control over their ancestral lands, and lack of protection for the 
native forest surrounding them—and took concrete steps to develop 
solutions to those problems.305 Although the project greatly benefitted from 
the institutional and technical support provided by the Chilean government 
agencies such as CONAF, and NGOs such as WWF-CODEFF, the 
communities sought those partnerships and, at each turning point, propelled 
the initiative forward.306 The Huilliche communities’ actions are 
particularly noteworthy because, unlike the example of co-administration in 
Los Flamencos, there was no precise legal framework or policy directive in 
place obligating the Chilean government to collaborate with the 
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communities. Instead, the communities had to be ready and willing to take 
full advantage of the opportunities that were already available. They did so 
and over the course of the next fifteen years, they continued to grow the 
scope of their authority and their own internal administrative and 
governance capacities.307 
The Huilliche example also confirms the importance of having capable 
and stable governing institutions. From a very early stage, the communities 
began the hard work of developing and implementing an institutional 
framework to meet the communities’ individual and collective needs. The 
Huilliche people started with local organization by forming Indigenous 
Communities under Chile law.308 Over time, those communities began 
working together and realized that they needed an institutional structure that 
could operate across communities. To address this issue, the Huilliche 
communities formed a working group that included representatives from all 
the affected communities, and, ultimately, formed an Indigenous 
Association that allowed for coordinated activities across a much larger 
geographical area.309 Without a large and stable institutional structure, 
cooperation between the various Huilliche communities would likely have 
been very difficult or would not have occurred. The institution’s stability 
has not only meant cooperation between communities, but has allowed for 
long-term networks to be formed and nurtured with funders, government 
agencies, and NGOs—each of which have proven to be vital to the success 
of the Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual.310 
The Huilliche communities’ efforts to organize have been effective, in 
part, because they reflect the traditional understanding of how power is 
divided among communities—in other words, there was cultural match 
between the organizational institutions and the expectations of the Huilliche 
people.311 The Huilliche people—like all Mapuche people—traditionally 
organize in a very decentralized fashion with local communities exercising 
enormous amounts of autonomy over their own affairs.312 Historically, 
however, a portion of this local autonomy is surrendered to a larger 
federation of communities in order to confront certain wide-reaching 
issues.313 The structure created by the Huilliche people to run the Red de 
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Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual reflects this understanding of power 
dynamics. Under the Indigenous Association created, individual Huilliche 
communities have autonomy over the parks in their territory and the 
services offered there; but larger issues of funding, long-term planning, and 
the coordination of technical assistance take place at a centralized level.314  
Finally, the Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual also 
demonstrates the importance of having a strategic orientation when acting. 
The Huilliche communities did not exercise practical self-rule, develop 
capable governing institutions, or take any other actions on a whim. Rather, 
from the very early stages of development, the communities were guided by 
a set of core goals related to the conservation and protection of their 
ancestral lands and to the strengthening of their control over those lands.315 
Every decision made was made to further these goals. And the decisions 
made were done so after deliberation and planning. The end result of the 
Huilliche communities’ strategic planning is not just the Red de Parques 
Comunitarios Mapu Lahual, but also a set of concrete plans and strategies 
for land management, resource conservation, and tourism development that 
will help guide the Huilliche peoples’ actions for years to come as they 
continue to exercise even greater amounts of self-determination.316 
C. Case Study Number Three: Identidad Territorial Lafkenche and the Ley 
Lafkenche 
1. Background 
The Lafkenche people—like the Huilliche people—are a sub-group of 
the larger Mapuche population.317 In the Mapuche language, “Lafkenche” 
literally means “people of the sea,” and it aptly described the Lafkenche 
people and their way of life.318 The Lafkenche people live in communities 
scattered along an extensive stretch of Chile’s southern coastline.319 The 
Lafkenche people’s culture, economy, and traditions are all closely tied to 
the ocean and, more specifically, its coastal waters.320 
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Unfortunately, starting in 1989, the Lafkenche peoples’ rights with 
respect to their traditional coastal waters were placed in jeopardy.321 In that 
year, the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura (Fishing and Aquiculture Law) was 
passed,322 which established the legal framework governing fishing 
activities nation-wide, but it neither considered the rights of Indigenous 
peoples nor did it take into account the Lafkenche people’s traditional use 
of the coastline and coastal waters for subsistence activities and other 
cultural practices.323 For the Lafkenche people, the Ley de Pesca y 
Acuicultura meant reduced ability to access, control, and use traditional 
coastal waters for cultural and/or economic purposes.324 In fact, under the 
Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura, a Lafkenche community seeking to make use 
of coastal water was required to obtain an extraction or use concession from 
the government.325 The concessions were available not just to Indigenous 
communities, but to all individuals and businesses as well, and although 
they carried with them some administrative rights, they also required the 
owner to pay taxes on the concession.326  
In reality, the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura was not concerned about 
Lafkenche traditional usage rights, but with Chile’s fishing industry.327 The 
new law significantly bolstered the fishing industry by strengthening both 
small- and large-scale fishing operations.328 More than twenty years after 
the passage of the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura, the fishing industry 
constitutes 1% of Chile’s gross domestic product and directly employs 
more than 120,000 people—including eighty thousand pescadores 
artesanales (traditional, local fishermen).329 Chile’s fishing industry is the 
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seventh most productive in the world,330 with traditional local fishing 
accounting for 50% of Chile’s total production.331 However, due to the 
shortcomings of the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura, the Lafkenche people were 
largely marginalized from this growing industry and losing their ability to 
rely on the coastal waters to live the way they had for centuries.332 
2. Self-Determination in Action 
In response to the legal and commercial developments affecting their 
traditional territory, the Lafkenche people began organizing in the early 
1990s to obtain legal recognition of their coastal access, use, and resource 
rights.333 The process started when Lafkenche leaders from diverse 
communities began a dialogue amongst themselves about the consequences 
the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura was having on their communities.334 Over 
time, this group of leaders grew as Lafkenche communities all along the 
Chilean coastline began feeling the effects of the new law on their 
communities. Together, these leaders began to explore different avenues of 
addressing the issues and challenges that the Lafkenche communities faced. 
Many options were considered, including, modifying the Ley de Pesca y 
Acuicultura, drafting and trying to pass new legislation, and not taking any 
action at all.335 
Most of the early discussions were spearheaded by two of the leading 
Lafkenche organizations at that time: Pu Lafkenche and Newen Pu 
Lafkenche. These two organizations worked to generate dialogue among the 
communities, as well as between the communities and public officials.336 
By 1998, the efforts of these organizations coalesced into a larger, and 
ultimately more powerful, organization named Identidad Territorial 
Lafkenche (Lafkenche Territorial Identity), which brought together leaders 
from diverse communities between Tirúa and Puerto Saavedra.337 
Specifically, Identidad Territorial Lafkenche’s reach begins at the northern 
edge of Chile’s Eighth Region of Bío-Bío and extends south through 
Chile’s Ninth Region, including the coastal areas of Arauco, Tucapel, 
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Tirúa, Bajo Imperial, Budi and Toltén.338 Additionally, throughout Chile’s 
Los Ríos and Los Lagos regions are a number of coastal Huilliche 
communities that also form part of the vast network of communities 
working to protect Indigenous coastal rights including communities in the 
areas of Valdivia, Osorno, Llanquihue, Chiloé and Palena,339 In total, the 
participating communities are scattered over more than 420 miles (680 
kilometers) of coastline.340 Although its territorial reach is extensive, 
Identidad Territorial Lafkenche has always had a singular purpose—to 
serve as the focal point for collective action promoting Lafkenche rights to 
coastal areas and waters.341  
Between 1997 and 2004, many Lafkenche (and Huilliche) communities 
came together to bring attention to their concerns in a number of ways, 
including by: organizing public marches; holding community workshops to 
raise awareness about the issues; and arranging meetings with public 
officials.342 The leaders began working on drafting their own modifications 
to the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura, which required working closely with 
Lafkenche communities to understand everyone’s visions for the borde 
costero (coastal area).343  These efforts culminated in an attempt to access 
the legislative process when, in 2001, the Chilean Congress was debating 
modifications to the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura.344 During these debates 
the Lafkenche communities presented their own set of modifications to 
Congress, but their suggestions were, ultimately, not incorporated into the 
law.345 
Shortly after their initial attempts to reform the Ley de Pesca y 
Acuicultura failed, the Lafkenche communities efforts were reinvigorated 
when one of their principal leaders—a man named Adolfo Millabur—was 
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elected alcalde (mayor) of Tirúa.346 While not a high-ranking elected office, 
Adolfo Millabur´s government position served to open the door to the 
bureaucratic and political networks necessary to continue moving the 
Lafkenche’s legislative goals forward and to make negotiation possible.347 
By leveraging new political connections, the Lafkenche leaders signed a 
cooperative agreement in 2003 with the Coordinador de Política Indígena 
(National Indigenous Policy Coordinator) and the Fishing Subsecretary of 
the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism to work jointly on 
developing a strategy to address the Lafkenche people’s concerns.348 
Ultimately, this new agreement and the dialogue it produced led to a 
strategic decision by the Lafkenche communities to focus on drafting an 
entirely new piece of legislation to protect their rights, rather than make 
another attempt at modifying the existing Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura.349 
Continuing to leverage political connections, Adolfo Millabur pushed for 
the creation of an inter-sectoral working group to draft what would 
ultimately become known as the Ley Lafkenche (Lafkenche Law).350 This 
working group included representatives from CONADI, representatives 
from the Ministry of Planning and Development, the Fishing Subsecretary, 
the Marine Subsecretary, a number of technical assistants and, of course, 
Indigenous leaders.351 In 2005, after ten months of sessions, the Lafkenche 
people were ready to present their proposed legislation to Congress.352 On 
August 21, 2005, President Ricardo Lagos presented the Ley Lafkenche to 
Congress on behalf of the Lafkenche people.353 Eventually, after three years 
of debates in the Congress,354 the Ley Lafkenche was passed at the end of 
2007, and went into effect in 2008.355  Regulations to implement the law 
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were adopted—again with the participation of Lafkenche leaders—in 
2009.356 
The Ley Lafkenche contains several features—unprecedented in Chilean 
law—officially protecting and promoting Indigenous rights to coastal 
resources.357 At its core, the Ley Lafkenche creates a new geographic-
administrative designation known as an “[I]ndigenous peoples’ marine 
coastal area.”358 These regions are ones where the Chilean government’s 
stated objective is “protecting the customary use of such spaces, in order to 
maintain the traditions and natural resource use of communities connected 
with the coastline”.359 Any Indigenous community or group of Indigenous 
communities that establishes its customary use of the coastline can request 
that a designated area be set aside for their use and administration.360 In 
order to obtain this designation, the Ley Lafkenche establishes an elaborate 
bureaucratic procedure that communities must go through.361 However, 
once the Chilean government recognizes a designated area, Indigenous 
communities enjoy relatively broad authority over the coastal area and are 
able to implement their own community-drafted, government-approved 
administration plan.362 This administration plan lays out the permitted 
activities and uses for both community members and non-community 
members.363 If the permitted activities include resource exploitation, then 
the communities must also have a management plan in place.364 Finally, the 
Ley Lafkenche grants the communities some authority to engage in conflict 
resolution should disputes arise between individual users and the 
community.365 
Although the Ley Lafkenche offers new opportunities to exercise self-
determination within recognized Indigenous peoples’ marine coastal areas, 
the law is not without its shortcomings.366 First, while the authority granted 
to communities can be extensive, it is not an absolute grant of rights over 
coastal areas, nor does it extend authority to any activities unrelated to use 
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of coastal areas.367 Second, the bureaucratic processes and standards set-up 
for obtaining a designation of a marine coastal area have been criticized as 
being overly burdensome and time-consuming.368 Third, the Ley Lafkenche 
does not protect Indigenous communities' rights of usage from being altered 
by other laws and regulations that more generally govern the fishing 
industry, including those related to environmental protection.369 Finally, 
among the largest criticisms of the Ley Lafkenche has been the Chilean 
government’s reluctance to designate any Indigenous marine coastal areas 
even after Indigenous communities successfully navigate the bureaucratic 
process required under the law.370 
Despite the law’s current shortcomings, the Ley Lafkenche continues to 
be one of the most significant pieces of Chilean legislation with respect to 
the recognition and protection of Indigenous rights.371 It remains one of the 
only pieces of Chilean legislation that promotes self-determination within a 
specific thematic area of law.372 And, on top of that, the Ley Lafkenche 
stands as a shining example of the positive impacts collective, strategic, and 
sustained actions by Indigenous peoples can have on law and policy.373 
3. Nation Building Principles 
The Lafkenche communities’ efforts to secure their own rights—through 
the Identidad Territorial Lafkenche organization—once again illustrate that 
the Nation Building principles have significance within the Chilean context. 
First, as with the other two case studies examined, is the principle of 
practical self-rule. In this case, the Lafkenche leaders were swift to respond 
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to the passage of the Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura in 1991—they had a “take 
charge” attitude that not only sought to raise awareness of rights violations, 
but also to develop concrete solutions to the issues that stood before them. 
The Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura presented an immediate threat to the 
Lafkenche people’s way of life and effectively excluded them from an 
industry that would prove to be of significant economic value in Chile.374 
The Lafkenche leaders wasted no time in beginning a dialogue amongst 
themselves about what they were going to do to confront this new 
challenge. Their posture throughout the entire process was one of self-
determination in action—the Lafkenche people knew that the solutions to 
their problem had to come from within their own communities because they 
were in the best position to develop a legislative response. In fact, for years 
the Lafkenche people worked to generate awareness, consensus and 
strategies without any assistance from outsiders. Many of the leaders were 
driven, in part, by the recognition that they, as the Lafkenche people, could 
confront this problem on their own.  
In order to seriously address the issues created by the Ley de Pesca y 
Acuicultura , the creation and maintenance of stable governing institutions 
were crucial.375 The need for such institutions was even highlighted by 
Adolfo Millabur in a presentation about the lessons learned from the 
Lafkenche experience.376 He specifically identified the creation of “an 
institutional counterpart” to the government as a key factor in their 
success.377 The process that ultimately led to the passage of the Ley 
Lafkenche began with the work of two strong Indigenous organizations—
Pu Lafkenche and Newen Pu Lafkenche—and continued after the creation 
of a new, larger organization—Identidad Territorial Lafkenche.378 
Identidad Territorial Lafkenche served the role Millabur identified because 
it was the Lafkenche people’s institutional counterpart to the Chilean 
government when it came time to negotiate and formulate legislative and 
political proposals.379 A strong institutional framework was necessary to 
bring together dozens of Lafkenche and Huilliche communities, make them 
a part of the Ley Lafkenche process, and then sustain their involvement in 
that process for over a decade.380 
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Part of the reason Identidad Territorial Lafkenche has had success in 
creating change is due to its strategic orientation and decision-making. The 
entire Ley Lafkenche process began very simply with the identification of a 
shared problem.381 Once the problem was identified, a lengthy process of 
dialogue took place. This dialogue was necessary to identify all available 
options for action, study their strengths and weaknesses, and, ultimately, to 
achieve consensus on what strategic direction to take as a collective. 
Throughout the entire process the communities were guided by a single 
strategic goal: to protect their culture, traditions, and economic activities 
through legislative action. That strategic goal guided their decisions to 
engage in consensus-building work at the community level, to search for 
political allies, to create the inter-sectoral working groups, and to formulate 
a legislative proposal for the protection of their rights.  
Finally, the Ley Lafkenche study demonstrates just how significant the 
principle of public-spirited leadership can be in any instance of Indigenous 
self-determination. The Lafkenche experience demonstrates a key role 
required of many Indigenous leaders—networking and consensus-building. 
Without consistent efforts by Lafkenche leadership to reach out to affected 
communities, involve them in the process, and build consensus around 
decision-making, it is unlikely that Identidad Territorial Lafkenche would 
have become as large and powerful as it did. Without that same hard work 
by Lafkenche leaders, it is also unlikely that Identidad Territorial 
Lafkenche could have sustained its efforts over the years necessary to 
achieve its strategic goal. Furthermore, through the actions of Adolfo 
Millabur upon being elected as alcalde, the Lafkenche experience 
demonstrates how a public-spirit oriented leader can use his or her position 
to bring about real change. Millabur’s efforts to serve as a bridge between 
Identidad Territorial Lafkenche and the Chilean government proved to be 
crucial in moving the Lafkenche legislative proposals forward. The ultimate 
result of the Lafkenche leadership’s vision and determination was a 
legislative victory for Indigenous peoples never seen before, and the 
creation of space in the law for the Lafkenche people to exercise true self-
determination over their traditional coastal territories. 
Conclusion 
In Chile—just as in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States—Indigenous peoples are economically, politically, and socially 
disadvantaged and marginalized as compared to the non-Indigenous 
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population. However, great variation exists among Indigenous peoples 
within Chile when it comes to the ability to carry out collective action for 
the betterment of their communities. Although quantitative data is still 
lacking in Chile, qualitative and anecdotal research indicates that the 
Indigenous communities that have successfully exercised some amount of 
self-determination over their own lives and cultures are communities that 
have closely adhered to the Nation Building principles. Three of the most 
meaningful examples of Indigenous self-determination from within Chile—
the Likan Antai people’s management of Valle de la Luna, the Huilliche 
people’s Red de Parques Comunitarios Mapu Lahual, and the Lafkenche 
people’s passage of the Ley Lafkenche—were successful due to the 
presence, in varying degrees, of practical self-rule, capable governing 
institutions, cultural match, strategic orientation, and/or public-spirited 
leadership.  
The three Indigenous self-determination case studies demonstrate the 
applicability of the Nation Building principles in Chile and beyond the 
English-speaking, common-law countries from which they were originally 
developed. While there are limitations on drawing broad conclusions from 
individual examples, the Chilean case studies provide strong evidence that 
Indigenous communities successfully exercising self-determination adhere 
to certain Nation Building principles, regardless of their geographic 
location or specific community goals. In other words, although there are 
significant historical, legal, and political differences between Chile and the 
former British colonies, what Indigenous self-determination means and how 
it can effectively be exercised in practice seems to transcend political 
boundaries.   
This conclusion should come as no surprise to anyone who has been 
working in the field of Indigenous rights in recent decades. At the 
international level, discussions have long focused on the shared challenges 
Indigenous peoples face and it makes sense that the responses and strategies 
Indigenous peoples use to overcome those challenges would also be shared 
to some extent. There is already international consensus that the history and 
values binding Indigenous peoples together globally is far more significant 
than the differences in the current economic, legal, and political contexts 
that various Indigenous peoples find themselves living within. Drawing 
from that shared history and shared experiences of colonization, the Nation 
Building principles offer guidance on how Indigenous peoples anywhere on 
the globe can retreat from the effects of colonization and move in the 
direction of meaningful self-determination.   
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
198 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
 
The preliminary conclusion presented here—that the Nation Building 
principles have applicability for Indigenous peoples living outside the 
British colonial context—creates some powerful suggestions for Indigenous 
rights going forward. Although it is true that recent decades have seen 
enormous strides made with respect to the development and promulgation 
of international Indigenous rights, much work remains to be done in the 
area of implementation. As field practitioners are well aware, there are 
enormous differences between the official recognition of Indigenous rights 
and the effective implementation of Indigenous rights within Indigenous 
communities. To date, the vast majority of nation-states’ and policy-
makers’ focus has been on what national governments can do to implement 
Indigenous rights. Significantly less focus has been placed on what 
Indigenous peoples themselves can and should be doing to bring about their 
own self-determination. The Nation Building principles fill this void and 
offer a concrete, straight-forward strategy for Indigenous peoples seeking to 
exercise self-determination. More than that, the research behind the Nation 
Building principles informs nation-states and policy-makers that self-
determination has never been shown to work for Indigenous peoples until 
space for its implementation is created and the power to exercise the right is 
firmly placed into the hands of Indigenous peoples. 
There are, of course, limitations on what the Nation Building principles 
have to offer. Most notably it must be understood that the Nation Building 
principles are not a one-size-fits-all model, but rather are malleable 
principles that will have to be adapted to fit a variety of contexts. For 
example, within the Chilean context, the meaning of practical self-rule—
the first of the Nation Building principles—is slightly different than it is 
within the United States context because Indigenous peoples in the United 
States have recognized sovereignty and governments, whereas in Chile 
Indigenous peoples do not. Likewise, what a capable governing institution 
looks like for Indigenous peoples in Chile is different than in the United 
States because the laws affecting Indigenous organization are different in 
those two nations. Similar types of differences exist between all nations 
and, therefore, how the Nation Building principles will play out in different 
nation-state contexts is going to be varied as well. 
Finally, the conclusion offered here is only preliminary and more 
research—preferably of the quantitative form—is needed to clearly 
establish the applicability of the Nation Building principles—not just in 
Chile, but throughout Latin America and the rest of the world as well. In the 
United States—and to a lesser extent in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand—the quantitative data at the Indigenous community level exists to 
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demonstrate the positive impact culturally, economically, politically, and 
socially that accompanies meaningful self-determination. In other nation-
states—including Chile—the lack of data is due, in part, to the fact that 
Indigenous rights and Indigenous self-determination have not had much 
time to generate meaningful consequences. The result is an inability to do 
the before-and-after comparisons needed to demonstrate the causes of 
meaningful change. Meaningful data is also lacking because governments, 
policy-makers, and researchers fail to focus time and energy on the role 
Indigenous peoples themselves can and should be playing in the 
implantation of their own rights.  
Ultimately, however, the success stories of Indigenous peoples in the 
former British colonies, coupled with the success stories from Chile 
presented in this paper, provide compelling evidence that the Nation 
Building principles offer something to both nation-states and Indigenous 
peoples alike—something powerful enough that it should no longer be 
ignored. For Indigenous peoples (and those interested in seeing Indigenous 
rights fully realized), the Nation Building principles offer the best hope of 
exercising meaningful Indigenous self-determination; for nation-states, the 
Nation Building principles offer the best hope of improving socioeconomic 
conditions for millions of Indigenous peoples worldwide. In short, the time 
is right for all parties interested in the full realization of Indigenous rights to 
take a careful, deliberate look at the Nation Building principles—the best 
explanation for how effective Indigenous self-determination comes about—
and to determine if they can be of use to the tens of millions of Indigenous 
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